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(DIS)OWNING RELIGIOUS SPEECH

B. Jessie Hill*

INTRODUCTION
To claims of a right to equal citizenship, one of the primary responses
has long been to assert the right of private property.1 One need only think of
Dred Scott v. Sandford,2 for example, or the sit-ins of the civil rights
movement to see the pull exerted by property rhetoric and principles on
those who would resist the demands of inclusion and equality.3 The latest
iteration of this dynamic, opposing property to equality, has taken shape in
the Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence concerning the constitutionality
of governmental choices with respect to the display of religious symbolism.
The permissibility of religious symbolism in public places has been a
significant concern of Establishment Clause jurisprudence for the past thirty
years, since the Supreme Court first held, in 1980, that a law requiring the
display of the Ten Commandments in public schools was unconstitutional.4
Beginning with Lynch v. Donnelly5 in 1984, the Supreme Court decided a
series of cases in which it struggled to clarify the doctrine and the nature of
*

Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Faculty Development and Research, Case Western
Reserve University School of Law. Versions of this paper were presented at the Annual Law and Religion Roundtable at Brooklyn Law School, the Case Western Summer Scholarship Workshop, the UCLA
Legal Theory Workshop, and the Temple University Law School Faculty Colloquium. I would like to
thank all those who gave me truly invaluable feedback in those and other settings, especially Jane Baron, Joseph Blocher, Alan Brownstein, Chip Carter, Caroline Corbin, Mary Jean Dolan, Chris Eisgruber,
Jon Entin, Dave Fagundes, Abner Greene, Andrew Koppelman, Ray Ku, Jacqui Lipton, Chris Lund,
Chip Lupu, Seana Shiffrin, Steve Shiffrin, Gary Simson, Nelson Tebbe, Laura Underkuffler, Jonathan
Varat, and Rob Vischer.
1 See, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 410 (1857) (stating, in response to the
argument that Dred Scott should be accorded the rights of citizenship, that “[t]he unhappy black race . . .
were never thought of or spoken to except as property”), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV.
2 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV.
3 See id. at 493-94. Free association is another right that is often opposed to equality claims. See,
e.g., Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 175-77 (1976) (rejecting the claim of parents that the integration of schools violates their right to freedom of association).
4 The first Supreme Court case dealing with public displays of religious symbolism was Stone v.
Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980) (per curiam), which held unconstitutional the display of the Ten Commandments in public schools. However, Stone was a brief per curiam opinion utilizing no discernible
doctrinal test.
5 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
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the right at stake, including County of Allegheny v. ACLU6 in 1989, Capitol
Square Review & Advisory Board v. Pinette7 in 1995, and the companion
cases Van Orden v. Perry8 and McCreary County v. ACLU9 in 2005.
Though the doctrinal framework shifted somewhat, the primary question
that the Court consistently sought to answer in those cases concerned the
social meaning of the display at issue, with a specific focus on whether that
display had the purpose or effect of conveying a message to nonadherents
that they were outsiders to the political community.10 In addition, and relatedly, the Court has issued a series of holdings in recent years asserting the
rights of religious speakers of all kinds to be included in various speech
fora alongside other speakers, religious or secular.11 To do otherwise, the
Court has made clear, would constitute viewpoint discrimination that is
inconsistent with the Free Speech Clause.12
In two recent cases, however, the Court made a surprising turn away
from its traditional analytic frameworks, focused on social meaning and
nondiscrimination, toward the language of property.13 In particular, the
Court has embraced one particular vision of property—viewing property as
synonymous with both private property and the right to exclude—and applied it in its treatment of religious speech issues in those cases.14 The first
of the recent cases, Pleasant Grove City v. Summum,15 is a free speech case
in which a municipality evaded a finding that it was discriminating against
the plaintiff’s religious speech by claiming the “government speech” defense.16 In the process, the defendant claimed as its own speech a facially
religious monument of the Ten Commandments.17 The second case, Salazar
v. Buono,18 which turned away an Establishment Clause challenge to a Latin
cross in the middle of the Mojave National Preserve, focused on the literal
ownership of the religious speech at issue in the case, rather than the social
6

492 U.S. 573 (1989).
515 U.S. 753 (1995).
8 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
9 545 U.S. 844 (2005).
10 See, e.g., Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Endorsement sends a message to
nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an accompanying
message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political community. Disapproval
sends the opposite message.”).
11 See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 107 (2001); Rosenberger v.
Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995); Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union
Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 395 (1993).
12 Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 107-10.
13 See Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1819 (2010) (plurality opinion); Pleasant Grove City v.
Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 469 (2009).
14 See Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1819; Summum, 555 U.S. at 469.
15 555 U.S. 460 (2009).
16 Id. at 464.
17 Id. at 464-67.
18 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010).
7
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meaning.19 What both cases have in common (other than that the plaintiffs
did not prevail) is a claim, on one side, that the government has improperly
and unconstitutionally excluded one religious group, both literally and metaphorically, and a response, on the other side, that is formulated in the language of ownership, private property, and sovereignty, rather than that of
social meaning or equality.20
This Article explores the possible causes and implications of the
Court’s recent embrace of property concepts and property rhetoric.21 This
Article thus contributes to the substantial scholarship on the relationship
between constitutional rights and property law—a body of scholarship that
has, however, not yet fully explored the role of property law and rhetoric in
religious display cases. More broadly, this Article attempts to examine,
through the lens of the Supreme Court’s rhetoric, the intense emotional
investment that both sides seem to have in the precise issue of the constitutionality of symbolic religious expression in the (literal or metaphorical)
public square.
This Article argues that the Court has turned to the language and the
law of private property partly as a way of avoiding the knotty questions
raised by Establishment Clause and free speech doctrine. It further argues
that the rhetoric of property functions on another level, as well. The Court’s
property rhetoric legitimates and naturalizes the act of exclusion sanctioned
by the Court’s decisions. It also gives the illusion of a concrete stake held
by a religious majority—a material loss that is incurred when dominant
religious symbols are removed. This Article thus proceeds from the intuitive view that the passion expressed by individuals both in favor of and
against such religious expression requires some explanation, given the apparently low material stakes and the concurrent difficulty that both sides
have in articulating any precise benefit or harm.22
One point about the Court’s use of property law and rhetoric bears
emphasizing at the outset. Property is a rich and extraordinarily complex
concept, and a large legal and philosophical literature has developed to elucidate both the nature of property itself and the legal, cultural, and moral
significance of property.23 Although some property scholars have embraced
19

Id. at 1811.
See id. at 1818; Summum, 555 U.S. at 469.
21 Although this Article observes a shift in the Supreme Court’s focus in the recent religious
symbolism cases, it also notes that property has long been implicated in this jurisprudence and indeed, is
inextricable from it. See infra Part I.A-C. Never before has property played such a prominent role in the
decisional framework or the rhetoric of the religious symbolism cases, however.
22 See CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE
CONSTITUTION 156-58 (2007) (discussing the “extreme passions these cases provoke”).
23 For a sampling of the wide array of works on the subject, see, e.g., J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF
PROPERTY IN LAW 68-69 (1997) (describing property as rights to take certain actions with respect to
things, and thus understood partly as a right to exclude, but also as fundamentally embedded within our
social relationships); Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 94
20
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the traditional understanding of property as signifying primarily the right to
exclude,24 other understandings of property abound, and recently, numerous
scholars have emphasized instead the inclusionary, public, and social dimensions of property.25
It is not possible to do justice to that nuanced body of literature within
the scope of this Article, nor is it one of the goals of this Article to do so.
Instead, this Article contends that the Supreme Court adopted one particular
conception of property in Summum and Buono—namely, the traditional
view of property rights as centering on the right to exclude. Moreover, as
explained in greater depth below, the Supreme Court elided the distinction
between public and private property, often assuming that government entities are entitled to dispose of their land in the exact manner of a private
person, and that government ownership of property must be treated as virtually identical, for all intents and purposes, to private ownership.26 This
Article criticizes the Supreme Court’s use of property-as-exclusion in these
religious speech cases as inapposite, not only because that understanding of
property is possibly flawed or at least highly contestable, but also because
property-as-exclusion is a uniquely misguided concept when constitutional
values are at stake.
At the same time, it is no contradiction to acknowledge that property
has been implicated in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence of religious symbolism all along, or that it is intertwined with the protection of many other

CORNELL L. REV. 745, 746-47 (2009) (rejecting the notion of property as dominated by exclusion); Jane
B. Baron, The Contested Commitments of Property, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 917, 920-21 (2010); Morris R.
Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8, 11-12 (1928); Hanoch Dagan, Property and the
Public Domain, 18 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 84, 85 (2006); Richard A. Epstein, Takings, Exclusivity and
Speech: The Legacy of Pruneyard v. Robins, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 21, 36-40 (1997) (taking an extreme
view of property as synonymous with the right to exclude); Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right
to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 734 (1998) (defending the view of property as the right to exclude);
Eduardo M. Peñalver, Property as Entrance, 91 VA. L. REV. 1889, 1938-40 (2005) (outlining an understanding of property as providing entrance to a community, not exit from it); Carol M. Rose, Property as
Storytelling: Perspectives from Game Theory, Narrative Theory, Feminist Theory, 2 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. 37, 38-39 (1990); Laura S. Underkuffler, On Property: An Essay, 100 YALE L.J. 127, 128
(1990).
24 See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 23, at 36; Merrill, supra note 23, at 730.
25 See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 23, at 746-47; Dagan, supra note 23, at 85; Peñalver, supra
note 23, at 1938; see also generally PROPERTY & COMMUNITY, at xxxiii (Gregory S. Alexander &
Eduardo M. Peñalver eds., 2010) (explaining how property theory should evaluate the interaction between the individual and the community); cf. Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125
HARV. L. REV. 1691, 1693 (2012) (stating that “[t]here is no interest in exclusion per se” and that property serves the interest in using things).
26 See infra note 27 and accompanying text. Professor David Fagundes has helpfully pointed out
that exclusion may be an important aspect of private property, at least in our traditional conception of it,
but that there is also a public dimension to property, which is often neglected. David Fagundes, Property
Rhetoric and the Public Domain, 94 MINN. L. REV. 652, 656 (2010).
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constitutional rights, as well.27 Indeed, First Amendment scholars have long
recognized the connection between property and speech. Ever since the rise
of so-called “public forum doctrine,” according to which the government’s
power to regulate speech depends on the nature of the forum in which the
speech takes place, this connection has been made explicit, leading to a rich
body of scholarship on the intersection of speech and property rights.28
Most of this scholarship has focused on the concept of property in forum
analysis, however; neither the importation of property concepts in the government speech doctrine nor the use of property law in Establishment
Clause disputes has garnered as much attention.29 Indeed, the turn to proper-

27 See Timothy Zick, Property as/and Constitutional Settlement, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1361, 1361
(2010) (“Certain constitutional rights are intricately bound up with, and in some cases critically dependent upon, access to and enjoyment of public properties.”). Professor Louis Seidman has thoughtfully
examined the ways in which free speech rights and property rights are deeply intertwined, arguing that
the strength of speech rights is directly proportional to the strength of economic rights. Louis Michael
Seidman, The Dale Problem: Property and Speech Under the Regulatory State, 75 U. CHI. L. REV.
1541, 1547 (2008).
28 It appears that Professor Harry Kalven, Jr. introduced the concept of the “public forum” in First
Amendment doctrine in his classic article The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965
SUP. CT. REV. 1, 11-12. Written in the midst of the civil rights movement, Professor Kalven’s article
meditates upon the relationship between the state’s property interest in public property and the public’s
free speech rights, arguing that “in an open democratic society the streets, the parks, and other public
places are . . . a public forum that the citizen can commandeer; the generosity and empathy with which
such facilities are made available is an index of freedom.” Id. at 11-12. Kalven thus famously spoke of a
sort of “First-Amendment easement” on public property possessed by citizens. Id. at 13. More recently,
Professor Timothy Zick has produced a deep and nuanced body of scholarship examining the relationship among property, space, and constitutional rights—especially free speech rights. See, e.g., Zick,
supra note 27, at 1385 (criticizing the use of private property principles to avoid constitutional issues in
resolving cases in the equality, religion, and speech contexts); Timothy Zick, Property, Place, and
Public Discourse, 21 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 173, 178 (2006) (arguing that “the ‘forum’ concept, which
is rooted in principles of [public] property, should be replaced by a distinct conception of ‘place’”);
Timothy Zick, Space, Place, and Speech: The Expressive Topography, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 439,
441-43 (2006) (introducing the concept of “expressive place,” which is distinct from, and richer than,
the concept of “place as res or property”). Like Professor Zick, Professor Calvin Massey has written
critically of courts’ inclination to place free speech problems in a property framework. Calvin Massey,
Public Fora, Neutral Governments, and the Prism of Property, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 309, 310-11 (1999).
And Professor Joseph Blocher has thoughtfully examined the expressive dimensions of property and
property rights, with particular reference to the concept of government speech. Joseph Blocher, Government Property and Government Speech, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1413, 1416-17 (2011).
29 But see Zick, supra note 27, at 1386-1400 (discussing ownership of religious symbols); id. at
1362 (thus, for example, “anti-establishment principles require that officials operate and maintain public
places in a manner that is not perceived as endorsing, through symbolic displays or otherwise, particular
religious sects or sectarianism”); Blocher, supra note 28, at 1416-17 (discussing government speech);
Nelson Tebbe, Privatizing and Publicizing Speech, 104 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 70, 70 (2009).
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ty in cases involving religious symbolism itself seems to be a relatively new
phenomenon.30
The doctrinal issues underlying cases such as Summum and Buono
have not been fully resolved, moreover; the staying power of the Supreme
Court’s property-based focus is thus of imminent importance. Indeed, the
Supreme Court recently denied certiorari in a case raising similar questions
pertaining to the public or private nature of religious speech—privately
financed and maintained crosses along public highways in Utah, commemorating fallen highway patrol officers.31 The denial came after much apparent hesitation, and some commentators expect that the Court will have to
return to these issues eventually.32
This Article thus examines the significance of the recent appearance of
property law and rhetoric in the Supreme Court’s religious symbolism cases. Part I of this Article describes the Court’s decisions in Summum and
Buono and briefly sketches the background of religious symbolism case law
against which the Supreme Court decided those cases. That Part thus traces
a shift to a “property paradigm” in the Court’s treatment of religious symbolism. Part II considers possible doctrinal and pragmatic reasons for the
shift. Part III then elaborates some of the troubling consequences of the
focus on ownership of speech rather than on the meaning of the speech.
This Article argues that the paradigm of property is an unfitting one to import into the First Amendment domain, since property rhetoric and law, as
mobilized by the Court in those cases, center around, justify, and naturalize
inequality and exclusion—values that are inherently antithetical to Establishment Clause and Free Speech Clause values. Returning to the explanatory project of this Article, Part IV contains some tentative meditations on
the deeper cause and meaning of the shift to ownership discourse within
Establishment Clause doctrine, viewed in the broader context of the U.S.
culture wars and the passionate response to this particular issue that those
culture wars entail. In Part V, this Article concludes that, for all their flaws,
the endorsement test and public forum doctrine, which the Court appears to
30 See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 470-71 (2009) (rejecting the plaintiff’s free
speech claim by placing the government in the role of a private property owner who is free to exclude
unwanted speech).
31 Utah Highway Patrol Ass’n v. Am. Atheists, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 12, 13 (2011) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
32 Dissenting from the denial of certiorari in the Utah Highway Patrol Association case, Justice
Clarence Thomas asserted that “[i]t is difficult to imagine an area of the law more in need of clarity,”
and insisted that the Court “should not now abdicate [its] responsibility to clean up [its] mess” but rather
should reconsider the currently predominant Lemon/endorsement test. Id. at 22; see also Stephen Wermiel, SCOTUS for Law Students: Free Speech and Religious Freedom Intersect in Case of Utah Crosses,
SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 24, 2011, 11:13 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/10/free-speech-andreligious-freedom-intersect-in-case-of-utah-crosses (noting that the Court listed the case three times for
consideration at the Justices’ private conferences without deciding whether to hear it, and noting that the
case raises several issues left unresolved in Summum and Buono).
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have temporarily marginalized, are superior approaches to the problem of
public displays of religious symbolism. The Court should therefore return
to its prior framework. It can, if necessary, avoid aggravating the divisiveness of religious symbolism disputes through more careful calibration of
remedies, instead of modifying substantive doctrine.
I.

FROM SOCIAL MEANING TO PROPERTY

When evaluating public displays of religious symbolism, the Supreme
Court’s approach has been to ensure that the government obeys the principles of nonendorsement and equality, both by avoiding any actual or perceived endorsement of religion and by ensuring that public fora are open to
all speakers, religious and nonreligious, on equal terms. 33 Pleasant Grove
City v. Summum and Salazar v. Buono, the two most recent Supreme Court
cases dealing with religious symbolism, appeared to marginalize the “endorsement/equality” approach, however.34 Those two cases adopted what
might be called a “property framework” for analysis. In both cases, the
Court’s analysis and result turned primarily on the ownership and attribution of the displays’ messages, rather than on the meaning of the messages
themselves.35 In Summum, the Supreme Court rejected the free speech claim
of a religious group seeking to have its permanent monument displayed
alongside the Ten Commandments and various more obviously secular
items in a publicly owned park known as Pioneer Park.36 The Court held
that the monuments in the park, while uniformly donated by private parties,
were government speech and therefore immune to claims of discriminatory
treatment from a free speech perspective.37 In Buono, a National Park Service employee challenged the presence on federal land of a Latin cross,
which served as a memorial to the soldiers who had died in World War I. 38
Although there was no majority opinion in that case, the Court held against
the cross’s challenger.39 A plurality opined that federal legislation transferring ownership of the cross to a private party, passed after the district court
33

See, e.g., Summum, 555 U.S. at 469.
This Article borrows the term “endorsement/equality” from Professor Martha Nussbaum. Professor Nussbaum refers to the “equality/endorsement framework” as the approach that is usually applied
by the Court in Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause cases dealing with school prayer and
religious symbolism displays; this Article extends the term to encompass public-forum free speech cases
as well. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE: IN DEFENSE OF AMERICA’S TRADITION
OF RELIGIOUS EQUALITY 260-72 (2008).
35 See Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1816-17 (2010) (plurality opinion); Summum, 555 U.S.
at 472.
36 Summum, 555 U.S. at 465.
37 Id. at 473-74.
38 Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1811-12.
39 Id. at 1816-17.
34
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found an Establishment Clause violation, had the potential to alleviate a
previously adjudicated constitutional violation.40
In some ways, these cases are quite distinct and may even be considered mirror images of one another.41 In Summum, which did not directly
deal with an Establishment Clause challenge,42 the Government claimed the
purportedly religious speech as its own and thereby deflected any argument
that it had behaved in a discriminatory manner with respect to the variety of
speakers seeking to have their symbols displayed in the park.43 In Buono, by
contrast, the Government’s strategy was to disown the allegedly religious
speech by transferring title to a private party, thereby deflecting the claim
that the Government had endorsed the religious message of the Latin
cross.44
Yet, the two cases have a number of things in common as well. First,
of course, the challengers lost in both cases.45 And, in holding for the governmental entity seeking to exclude a private religious speaker in both instances, the Court embraced the language of property, focusing on ownership and control of the challenged speech.46 In both cases, the Court ultimately resolved the controversy against the plaintiffs by placing the religious speech into a framework in which the speaker has the virtually unlimited right to exclude any kind of speech for any kind of reason and is not
subject to requirements of neutrality.47 In other words, the Court found in
both cases that the ownership of the religious speech—private ownership in
one case and government ownership in the other—rendered the Government immune from claims of religious discrimination.48

40

Id. at 1814-15.
Cf. Tebbe, supra note 29, at 71 (“One of these cases, then, asks whether government can avoid
a constitutional difficulty by publicizing private sectarian speech, while the other asks whether government can evade a different constitutional problem by privatizing such expression.”).
42 Although the Supreme Court alluded to the Establishment Clause implications of its holding,
the plaintiffs had not raised a federal Establishment Clause claim, choosing instead to rely solely on the
Free Speech Clause. Summum, 555 U.S. at 466. As Professor Bernadette Meyler explains, plaintiff
Summum initially raised a claim under the Utah Constitution’s anti-establishment provisions but did not
pursue that claim in the litigation, and it was deemed waived by the Tenth Circuit. Bernadette Meyler,
Summum and the Establishment Clause, 104 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 95, 98-99 (2009). Summum
subsequently amended its complaint to include an Establishment Clause claim, which was dismissed by
the district court. Summum v. Pleasant Grove City, No. 2:05CV638 DAK, 2010 WL 2330336, at *4 (D.
Utah June 3, 2010).
43 See Summum, 555 U.S. at 467.
44 See Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1814.
45 Id. at 1811; Summum, 555 U.S. at 466.
46 See Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1818-19; Summum, 555 U.S. at 473-74.
47 See Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1818-19; Summum, 555 U.S. at 473-74.
48 See Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1818-19; Summum, 555 U.S. at 473-74.
41
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The Endorsement-Equality Framework

Although the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence
concerning religious symbolism is famously messy and widely criticized,
some general principles can be derived from it.49 Above all, the analysis has
focused on the social meaning of a given display and specifically on the
question whether that display conveyed a message of endorsement of a particular religion, or of religion in general, thereby suggesting that nonadherents are social and political outsiders.50 This analysis is embodied in the socalled “endorsement test,” and it is—for the time being, at least—the predominant approach to evaluating the constitutionality of religious symbolism displays.51 Even when the Court has declined to apply the endorsement
test in a given religious symbolism case, however, a majority of the Justices
still sought to resolve the central question that the endorsement test also
seeks to address—namely, the social meaning of the display to a reasonable
observer, viewed in its physical, temporal, and historical context.52
To date, the Supreme Court has not had as much opportunity to consider free speech challenges to the exclusion of religious symbols from public fora.53 Nonetheless, it has developed a body of doctrine holding with
great clarity that governmental entities may not discriminate against religious speech simply because of its religious, even devotional, character.54
And in Capitol Square Review & Advisory Board v. Pinette,55 involving the
placement of a Latin cross by the Ku Klux Klan in a public square near the
seat of government, the Court made it clear both that the Free Speech
Clause required, and the Establishment Clause did not prohibit, equal access to public fora for those seeking to erect religious displays.56 The animating principle in all of those cases was a prohibition on discrimination
49 See, e.g., Shari Seidman Diamond & Andrew Koppelman, Measured Endorsement, 60 MD. L.
REV. 713, 719-20 (2001); B. Jessie Hill, Putting Religious Symbolism in Context: A Linguistic Critique
of the Endorsement Test, 104 MICH. L. REV. 491, 493-95 (2005) (arguing that the endorsement test in its
current application reflects certain difficulties that are inherent to any inquiry into social meaning but
that the test ultimately asks the right questions); William P. Marshall, “We Know It When We See It”:
The Supreme Court and Establishment, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 495, 536-37 (1986); Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment Neutrality and the “No Endorsement” Test,
86 MICH. L. REV. 266, 276-301 (1987).
50 See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, “Bizarre Districts,” and
Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483,
512 (1993).
51 See 2 KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 88 (2008) (noting that a majority
of the Justices “ha[ve] treated the [endorsement] inquiry as central only in the public display cases”).
52 See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 691-92 (2005) (Rehnquist, C.J.).
53 See discussion infra Part I.A.2.
54 See discussion infra Part I.A.2.
55 515 U.S. 753 (1995).
56 Id. at 766.
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against speech based on its religious viewpoint, both in public fora and in
those spaces characterized as limited public fora.57
1.

The Endorsement-Social Meaning Framework in Establishment
Clause Cases

The endorsement-social meaning framework first arose in Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s Lynch v. Donnelly concurrence, in which she formulated the endorsement test.58 Though she ultimately agreed with the majority’s decision to uphold the display of a nativity scene in a privately owned
park at Christmastime, she famously asserted that the proper inquiry in such
cases is whether, by symbolically endorsing religion, the challenged governmental action “sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders,
not full members of the political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political
community.”59 The newly minted endorsement test then garnered the support of a majority of Justices, though in a set of badly fractured decisions, in
County of Allegheny v. ACLU.60 That case involved a challenge to two different displays—a crèche and a menorah—both of which were owned by
private groups and situated on government property.61 The Court upheld the
menorah display but found the crèche unconstitutional, with members of
the concurrence and dissents reaching different conclusions but agreeing on
the applicability of the endorsement test.62
Though the endorsement test appeared to provide some structure for
the constitutional inquiry when religious displays were at issue, it did not
take long for cracks to appear in its already-fragile façade.63 The endorsement test fell from prominence—but without disappearing entirely—in two
companion cases decided in 2005, dealing with challenges to displays of the
Ten Commandments on government-owned property.64 In McCreary County v. ACLU, the Court declared the displays, which had been erected by the
local government inside county courthouses, unconstitutional as motivated
57

Id. at 761.
See generally Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688-94 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
59 Id. at 688.
60 County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 593-94 (1989); see id. at 623-37 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment); id. at 637-46 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 646-55 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 655-79 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
61 Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 579, 587 (majority opinion).
62 See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
63 The cracks were already evident by the fractured nature of the Allegheny opinion. See supra
text accompanying note 60.
64 McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 850-51 (2005); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677,
681-82 (2005).
58

2013]

(DIS)OWNING RELIGIOUS SPEECH

371

by a religious purpose.65 In so doing, the Court applied the alternative Establishment Clause test set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman.66 In looking to
Lemon, the Court chose an alternative test, but one affiliated with the endorsement test.67 Moreover, the Court showed itself still to be concerned
with the social meaning of the display. Invoking the language of the endorsement test, the Court noted that “[t]he reasonable observer could only
think that the [c]ounties meant to emphasize and celebrate the Commandments’ religious message” when they mounted their initial Ten Commandments displays, and, given the counties’ continuing religious purpose, declined to find that this fact had been changed by the subsequent displays.68
Finally, in Van Orden, the Court considered the constitutionality of a Ten
Commandments display, which had been donated forty years earlier by a
private entity, on the Texas statehouse grounds.69 Although there was no
majority rationale for upholding the display,70 a majority of the Justices
applied the endorsement test, or its substantial equivalent, in determining
that the overall meaning of the Ten Commandments display was secular
rather than religious.71
Thus, although the Justices have regularly divided over both the result
and the precise doctrinal test for evaluating the constitutionality of religious
symbolism, one relatively constant principle has been that a majority of
Justices have focused on the social meaning of the display, as perceived by
the so-called “reasonable observer.”72 In some instances the religious symbol was privately owned and in some instances it was government-owned,
65

Id. at 850-51, 858.
Id. at 859-61 (applying the test set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971)).
67 See, e.g., McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 866 (describing the purpose inquiry of the Lemon test
in terms drawn from the endorsement test and citing cases that have applied the endorsement test).
68 Id. at 855, 869, 869-73.
69 Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 681-82 (2005).
70 As Kent Greenawalt explains, in Van Orden and McCreary, eight Justices thought the cases
should come out the same way, though they didn’t agree on how. Only Justice Breyer saw a difference
between the two cases, and he therefore cast the swing vote. GREENAWALT, supra note 51, at 86. His
opinion, joined by no one, also provides the relevant rationale for the case, as it provides the narrowest
ground supporting the decision. See, e.g., Paul E. McGreal, Social Capital in Constitutional Law: The
Case of Religious Norm Enforcement Through Prayer at Public Occasions, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 585, 619
n.156 (2008).
71 Hill, supra note 49, at 502 (stating that Justice Breyer “analyzed the display in light of the
physical and historical context in order to determine whether a religious or secular message was conveyed—an analysis that is functionally equivalent to the endorsement inquiry”); McGreal, supra note
70, at 619 n.156 (noting that four Justices in dissent applied the endorsement test). Justice Breyer did not
claim to be applying any particular test but rather to be using “legal judgment”; in addition to the contextual factors, the divisiveness that would be caused by tearing down the monument, as opposed to the
relative lack of divisiveness that the monument had caused during the forty years it had stood there,
seemed to play an important role for Justice Breyer. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 700 (Breyer, J., concurring).
72 See McGreal, supra note 70, at 619-20.
66
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but the ownership of, or control over, the symbol itself never appeared to
make any difference to the Court’s analysis.73 As described above, the displays in Allegheny were privately owned but placed in publicly owned
spaces.74 In Van Orden, the challenged display had been donated to the
government by a private group and placed in a publicly owned park.75
Though the provenance of the displays in McCreary is unclear, at the time
of the lawsuits the government controlled them and they were located in
public buildings.76 Finally, the display in Lynch was owned by the government, but placed in a privately owned park.77
2.

The Equality-Nondiscrimination Framework in Free Speech
Cases

In Capitol Square Review & Advisory Board v. Pinette, the Supreme
Court addressed for the first time the free speech rights of those seeking to
place a religious symbol in a public forum.78 In Pinette, the Ku Klux Klan
claimed that the City of Columbus, Ohio had discriminated against it,
thereby violating the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment, by refusing to allow it to place a large Latin cross in Capitol Square, a public plaza
situated near the seat of government.79 The city had claimed it was not discriminating against the Klan’s message but rather had declined the symbol
for fear of violating the Establishment Clause.80 The question before the
Court was therefore “whether a State violates the Establishment Clause
when, pursuant to a religiously neutral state policy, it permits a private party to display an unattended religious symbol in a traditional public forum
located next to its seat of government.”81
73

See generally Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 691-92 (failing to discuss ownership of the symbol in its
analysis); McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 881 (failing to consider ownership of the symbol in its analysis); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 600 (1989) (stating explicitly that private ownership
did not alter the Court’s analysis).
74 Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 579.
75 Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 681-82.
76 None of the published opinions in McCreary discusses the counties’ acquisitions of the Ten
Commandments in any detail. See McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 861; ACLU v. McCreary County, 145
F. Supp. 2d 845, 846 (E.D. Ky. 2001), aff’d, 354 F.3d 438 (6th Cir. 2003), aff’d 545 U.S. 844 (2005);
ACLU v. McCreary County, 96 F. Supp. 2d 679, 684 (E.D. Ky. 2000); Doe v. Harlan Cnty. Sch. Dist.,
96 F. Supp. 2d 667, 670-71 (E.D. Ky. 2000).
77 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 671 (1984) (“Each year, in cooperation with the downtown
retail merchants’ association, the city of Pawtucket, R.I., erects a Christmas display as part of its observance of the Christmas holiday season. The display is situated in a park owned by a nonprofit organization and located in the heart of the shopping district.”).
78 Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 759 (1995).
79 Id. at 758-59.
80 Id. at 759-60.
81 Id. at 757.
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Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for the Court, began by articulating the
now-uncontroversial proposition that “private religious speech, far from
being a First Amendment orphan, is as fully protected under the Free
Speech Clause as secular private expression.”82 He then cited the body of
precedent establishing the norm of equality and nondiscrimination with
respect to religious speech in public and limited public fora.83 Indeed, the
Court has long held that it constitutes unconstitutional content- or viewpoint-based discrimination to treat religious speech—whether in the form of
worship, prayer, or speech from a religious perspective—less favorably
than secular speech.84
In addressing the Establishment Clause issue, however, Justice Scalia
represented only a plurality of the Justices.85 Perhaps foreshadowing the
property-focused approach that would soon come to dominate the Court’s
case law, his opinion advocated for a per se rule that private religious
speech in a true and properly administered public forum cannot violate the
Establishment Clause.86 Justice Scalia thus dismissed concerns about “mistaken” perceptions of endorsement by observers seeing an unattended cross
in such close proximity to the seat of government.87 Instead, he focused
primarily on the nature of the forum and the access to it, as well as the public or private nature of the speech rather than on the message conveyed. 88
He thus dismissed “[t]he test petitioners propose, which would attribute to a
neutrally behaving government private religious expression.”89
Yet, Justice Scalia’s proposed categorical approach did not win out.90
Justice O’Connor’s concurrence, joined by Justices David Souter and Stephen Breyer, persisted in applying an endorsement analysis.91 While noting
that it was unlikely that private religious speech in a true public forum
could be perceived as an endorsement of religion, Justice O’Connor’s opin82

Id. at 760 (citing Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993);
Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Sch. (Dist. 66) v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990); Widmar v. Vincent,
454 U.S. 263 (1981); Heffron v. Int’l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981)).
83 Id. at 761.
84 See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 107-09 (2001) (holding that
exclusion of a religious children’s organization from use of school property on the same terms as other
groups constituted unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of
Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 830-35 (1995) (holding that denial of funding to religious student publication by a public university constituted viewpoint discrimination); Widmar, 454 U.S. at 267-70 (holding
exclusion of student groups from using school property for religious worship and discussion to be unconstitutional content-based discrimination).
85 See Capitol Square, 515 U.S. at 770. The plurality was composed of Justice Scalia, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Kennedy and Thomas.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 766, 770.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 763-64 (citations omitted).
90 See id. at 757.
91 Capitol Square, 515 U.S. at 777 (O’Connor, J., concurring).

374

GEO. MASON L. REV.

[VOL. 20:2

ion declined to sign on to a per se rule and maintained a focus on the message actually conveyed to the reasonable observer by the display, given its
overall context.92 Even when private speech in a public forum is involved,
Justice O’Connor argued, an endorsement effect may still arise in some
circumstances, “whether because of the fortuity of geography, the nature of
the particular public space, or the character of the religious speech at issue,
among others.”93
Thus, although the result in Capitol Square might suggest that issues
of ownership and the private or public nature of the speech were central to
the Establishment Clause analysis, in fact a majority of the Justices still
perceived a different fundamental question.94 They considered whether the
privately owned cross, situated in a public forum, conveyed a message of
endorsement of religion in light of its physical setting, proximity to the seat
of government, and lack of disclaimer and accompanying secular symbolism.95 Capitol Square may be viewed as a transitional case that foreshadows
the decisions and the paradigm shift in Summum and Buono, but one that
nonetheless remains firmly planted in the endorsement/equality framework.
B.

Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, Salazar v. Buono, and the Turn to
Property

The decisive shift toward the property framework began with Summum. Although the Court’s unanimous holding—that the religious group
Summum did not have a Free Speech right to install its monument among
other permanent monuments in a city-owned park—likely surprised no one,
92

Justice O’Connor suggested that, because the “reasonable observer” is presumed to be aware
that the forum is a traditional public forum, open to all comers, he or she would not perceive an endorsement of religion in the City’s decision to allow the Klan to use the space on the same terms as all
other groups. Id. at 775-77, 780-82.
93 Id. at 778. Though Justice O’Connor did not give any examples of what she meant when she
suggested that an inference of endorsement could still arise in a true public forum, one might imagine a
case in which, for example, a religious group operating in a public forum includes the city seal on its
religious symbols, thereby suggesting an official imprimatur. Cf. Am. Atheists, Inc. v. Davenport, 637
F.3d 1095, 1121 (10th Cir. 2010) (noting as one factor in finding the Establishment Clause violated by
the placement of Latin crosses on public land—though not in a public forum—that each “cross conspicuously bears the imprimatur of a state entity”), cert. denied sub nom. Utah Highway Patrol Ass’n v. Am.
Atheists, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 12 (2011).
In Capitol Square, Justices Stevens and Ginsburg dissented on the grounds that the cross’s
location, lack of a disclaimer attributing its message to a private group, and proximity to key government buildings conveyed a message of religious endorsement, notwithstanding the nature of the Capitol
Square forum. 515 U.S. at 800-02 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 817-18 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
94 See id. at 776, 778 (O’Connor, J., concurring); id. at 785 (Souter, J., concurring); id. at 800-02
(Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 817-18 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
95 See id. at 776, 778 (O’Connor, J., concurring); id. at 785 (Souter, J., concurring); id. at 800-02
(Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 817-18 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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the Court’s rationale appeared less foreordained.96 Somewhat controversially, and one might even say implausibly, the Court held that the privately
donated monuments in the public park constituted government speech,
thereby rendering the City doctrinally immune from claims of viewpoint
discrimination in its selection of monuments.97
A small religious group brought the Summum lawsuit, seeking to place
a permanent stone monument in a public park (Pioneer Park) in Pleasant
Grove City, Utah.98 As in Van Orden, the park already contained a Ten
Commandments monument donated decades earlier by the Fraternal Order
of Eagles, along with a number of permanent secular monuments.99 The
Summum group wished to add its “Seven Aphorisms of SUMMUM,”
which were roughly its equivalent of the Ten Commandments, to be “similar in size and nature to the Ten Commandments monument.”100 When the
City refused the donation, the group asserted a violation of its free speech
rights, claiming that the City had engaged in viewpoint discrimination by
refusing to permit the group’s expression in a public forum.101 In response,
the City maintained that the monuments in the park were its own speech—
“government speech”—and therefore immune to such claims.102 Though the
Summum group had achieved an initial victory in the Tenth Circuit, ultimately the Supreme Court sided with the defendant City, embracing its
government-speech rationale.103
The label of government speech serves as a defense to a free speech
claim.104 If the government is expressing its own message rather than
providing a forum for private speech, the doctrine holds, then it has leeway
to exclude or discriminate against private messages in any way it sees fit.105
Thus, the government assumes the role of a private speaker and is free from
the rules against content- and viewpoint-based discrimination that apply

96

See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Justices Grapple with Question of Church Monument as Free Speech
Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2008, at A24 (stating that the oral argument questioning was “not a good
sign for Summum”); Chris Lund, Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, PRAWFSBLAWG (Nov. 10, 2008,
12:06 AM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2008/11/pleasant-grove.html (“I think the smart
money is on Summum losing.”).
97 Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 464 (2009).
98 Id. at 465-66.
99 Id. at 464-65.
100 Id. at 465.
101 Id. at 466.
102 Id. at 467.
103 Summum, 555 U.S. at 464.
104 See, e.g., Claudia E. Haupt, Mixed Public-Private Speech and the Establishment Clause, 85
TUL. L. REV. 571, 573 (2011) (“If the speech is government speech . . . the Free Speech Clause does not
apply.”).
105 Id.
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when it acts as regulator.106 No government could do its job, after all, unless
it is able to express its views on matters like foreign policy or public health,
without having to provide a platform for opposing views at every turn. The
government may, and indeed must, exercise dominion and control over its
own message. Of course, the fact that government speech is immune from
claims of viewpoint discrimination does not mean that it is protected from
claims that it violates other constitutional prohibitions—such as the Establishment Clause.107 The Establishment Clause was not, however, directly
relevant in the Summum case because the plaintiff had not pressed an Establishment Clause claim.108
In holding that the monuments in the park constituted government
speech, the Court in Summum adopted an analytic framework centered on
concepts of sovereignty, ownership, and property.109 More striking, this
holding placed the governmental defendant in the role of private property
owner. In transforming the central controversy in the case from a free
speech issue into, essentially, a property issue, the Court was able to shortcircuit the free speech claim.110 Having determined that the speech belonged
to the government, the Court had automatically resolved the free speech
issue. But putting the government in the place of the private property owner
appears to ignore completely any claim that the public itself has to the land.
Indeed, government speech doctrine itself tends to place the government in the position of a private party—that is, of an employer, market participant, and exerciser of private law rights to control property and exclude
others. For example, the government speech cases describe the government
as “raising [its] voice in the ‘marketplace of ideas.”111 Following this paradigm, Justice Samuel Alito’s majority opinion in Summum repeatedly refers
to the city as a “property owner”112 and notes that it “took ownership”113 of
the various monuments in the park.
Moreover, the Court expressly linked the City’s ownership of the
monument not so much to expression of a message as to the City’s very
106

Id. at 577; Joseph Blocher, Property and Speech in Summum, 104 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY
83, 89 (2009) (“[W]hen the government speaks . . . , it has a near-absolute right to control its message.”).
107 See, e.g., Andy G. Olree, Identifying Government Speech, 42 CONN. L. REV. 365, 367-68
(2009).
108 See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
109 See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 470-74, 476 (2009).
110 See Tebbe, supra note 29, at 72 (describing Summum as a case in which the government “successfully insulated itself from a constitutional challenge through actions involving a property transfer”).
111 Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 574 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting). Of course,
the “marketplace of ideas” is a familiar trope, but as Professor Blocher notes, the language of a speech
market nonetheless implies concepts of privatization and rivalrousness. Blocher, supra note 106, at 91.
112 See, e.g., Summum, 555 U.S. at 471 (using the term three times in one paragraph to refer to the
city, albeit in the abstract).
113 Id. at 473.
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identity.114 “[T]he City took ownership of [the Ten Commandments] monument and put it on permanent display in a park that it owns and manages
and that is linked to the City’s identity. All rights previously possessed by
the monument’s donor have been relinquished,” Justice Alito explained.115
Yet, in assuming the City’s possession of the monument to be an expressive
act, the Court was again placing the government in the exact position of a
private property owner. If a private individual or organization takes ownership of a monument and displays it, it is reasonable to assume that the act
expresses something about the owner’s views. The government is not usually in the same position, however, given that it often holds land in public
trust, for public use, and possibly for expression of the public’s views, with
which the government may or may not agree.116 It simply makes no sense to
analogize the government’s relationship to the monuments in a public park
to the relationship of a private property owner to the expressive objects he
or she displays.
At the same time, the Court downplayed the meaning of the Ten
Commandments monument itself, as it questioned the determinacy of such
messages with almost postmodern zeal—even going so far as to place the
word “message” in scare quotes:
Respondent seems to think that a monument can convey only one “message” . . . . This argument fundamentally misunderstands the way monuments convey meaning. . . . Even when
a monument features the written word, the monument may be intended to be interpreted, and
may in fact be interpreted by different observers, in a variety of ways. . . . Contrary to respondent’s apparent belief, it frequently is not possible to identify a single “message” that is
conveyed by an object or structure . . . .117

Justice Alito’s opinion thus sidelines the issue of the Ten Commandments’
possibly exclusionary meaning by simply treating it as indeterminate.
Some of the Justices recognized that the category of government
speech—with the proprietary and exclusionary dimensions that it implies—
was a poor fit with the type of expressive activity involved in the Summum
case.118 Justice John Paul Stevens asserted that “the reasons justifying the
city’s refusal [of the monument] would have been equally valid if its acceptance of the monument, instead of being characterized as ‘government

114 Indeed, Professor Mary Jean Dolan refers to such monuments as governmental “identity
speech.” Mary Jean Dolan, Government Identity Speech and Religion: Establishment Clause Limits after
Summum, 19 WM & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 4 (2010) [hereinafter Dolan, Government Identity Speech];
see also Mary Jean Dolan, Why Monuments Are Government Speech: The Hard Case of Pleasant Grove
City v. Summum, 58 CATH. U. L. REV. 7, 26-30 (2008).
115 Summum, 555 U.S. at 473-74.
116 The author is indebted to Dave Fagundes for raising this point.
117 Summum, 555 U.S. at 474, 476.
118 See Blocher, supra note 106, at 92.
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speech,’ had merely been deemed an implicit endorsement of the donor’s
message.”119 Likewise, Justice Souter suggested that
[t]o avoid relying on a per se rule to say when speech is governmental, the best approach that
occurs to me is to ask whether a reasonable and fully informed observer would understand
the expression to be government speech, as distinct from private speech the government
chooses to oblige by allowing the monument to be placed on public land.120

Those concurring opinions, while supporting the result, nonetheless demonstrate a discomfort with the property-based approach that the majority’s
rhetoric suggested, preferring to consider ownership as merely a factor relevant to the endorsement inquiry.
The Court’s property-as-exclusion focus continued in its next religious
symbolism case—this time, a seemingly more straightforward Establishment Clause challenge. In Buono, a retired National Park Service employee,
Frank Buono, brought an Establishment Clause challenge to a Latin cross
that was initially erected by private individuals acting unofficially and
without permission at Sunrise Rock in the Mojave National Preserve.121
Buono brought his challenge after another individual sought to have a Buddhist shrine placed on the same site but was denied permission by the Government.122
The rather byzantine procedural history of Buono may account to
some degree for the strange configuration of the Justices’ opinions in that
case. Buono’s claim initially succeeded on summary judgment in 2002 before the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, resulting
in an injunction requiring the cross to be dismantled.123 During the pendency of that litigation and prior to the Ninth Circuit’s affirmance of the district
court’s decision, however, Congress had intervened in various ways with
the ostensible purpose of keeping the cross from being dismantled: first, by
passing two separate appropriations provisions that forbade the expenditure
of public funds for the removal of the cross; second, by designating the
cross a national memorial; and third, by passing a statute transferring the
land to the Veterans of Foreign Wars in exchange for another privatelyowned parcel of land elsewhere in the National Preserve.124 Despite the land
transfer, the Government retained a measure of control over the land, in that
119

Summum, 555 U.S. at 481 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id. at 487 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Souter also noted that “[t]his reasonable observer test
for governmental character is of a piece with the one for spotting forbidden governmental endorsement
of religion in the Establishment Clause cases.” Id.
121 Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1812 (2010) (plurality opinion).
122 Buono v. Kempthorne, 527 F.3d 758, 769 (9th Cir. 2008) (McKeown, J., dissenting from denial
of rehearing en banc), rev’d sum nom. Salazar v. Buono, 130 S.Ct 1803 (2010).
123 Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1812. The Ninth Circuit stayed the requirement of dismantling the cross,
however, and allowed the Government to cover it instead. Id. at 1812-13.
124 Id. at 1813.
120
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it would revert back to Government ownership if it ceased being maintained
as a war memorial.125
The Government did not petition for certiorari after the Ninth Circuit
also decided in Buono’s favor.126 In the course of affirming, however, the
Ninth Circuit had not addressed the relevance, if any, of the congressional
land transfer statute on the Establishment Clause holding.127 Thus, Buono
returned to the district court and sought to prevent the land transfer by asking the district court either to hold that the transfer violated the 2002 injunction or to modify that injunction to forbid the transfer.128 The district court
did the former, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed again.129 The Government
then successfully sought certiorari.130
The controversy before the district court on remand from the Ninth
Circuit, after the land transfer statute, had seemed to center around the relatively straightforward question whether the proposed transfer was a sham,
intended to avoid the force of the initial injunction, or instead was a valid
remedy for the Establishment Clause violation.131 Applying a series of factors based on other lower courts’ encounters with this precise issue, the
appellate court held that the circumstances of the particular sale at issue in
Buono indicated that it was an attempt to evade the court’s ruling and therefore that the transfer should be blocked.132
The Supreme Court plurality’s understanding of the problem before it
was entirely different, however.133 Instead of ruling on the validity of the
land transfer, it assumed the transfer as a sort of fait accompli and then instructed the lower court to decide whether the fact of the symbol’s presence
on private property affected the Establishment Clause analysis.134 To this
inquiry, it appeared, the plurality expected the answer to be “yes.”135 In other words, the plurality treated the ownership or attribution of the symbol as
the decisive factor in the case; rather than asking whether the Government’s
125

Id.
Buono v. Norton, 371 F.3d 543, 550 (9th Cir. 2004).
127 Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1813.
128 Id. at 1813-14.
129 Id. at 1814.
130 Id.
131 Buono v. Norton, 364 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1178 (C.D. Cal. 2005), aff’d sub nom. Buono v.
Kempthorne, 527 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 2008), rev’d sub nom. Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010).
132 Id. at 1179-82; see Mercier v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 395 F.3d 693, 702 (7th Cir. 2005);
Paulson v. City of San Diego, 294 F.3d 1124, 1133 (9th Cir. 2002); Freedom from Religion Found. v.
City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d 487, 491 (7th Cir. 2000); see generally Paul Forster, Note, Separating
Church and State: Transfers of Government Land as Cures for Establishment Clause Violations, 85
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 401 (2010).
133 The plurality opinion was written by Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, and
joined in part by Justice Alito (who agreed with the entire opinion except the decision to remand).
Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1811 (plurality opinion).
134 Id. at 1820.
135 Id. at 1819-20.
126
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actions, taken as a whole, should be understood as an endorsement of religion in violation of the First Amendment, the plurality focused only on the
ownership of the symbol.136 “The injunction was issued to address the impression conveyed by the cross on federal, not private, land,” Justice Anthony Kennedy’s opinion explained.137 The opinion then cited Summum for
the notion that “‘[p]ersons who observe donated monuments routinely—and
reasonably—interpret them as conveying some message on the property
owner’s behalf.’”138 Thus, the Court remanded to the district court to reconsider its decision “in light of the change in law and circumstances effected
by the land-transfer statute” and even questioned whether on remand the
“reasonable observer” standard embodied in the endorsement test remained
the proper one for analyzing the constitutionality of “objects on private
land.”139
Justice Scalia, who concurred in the judgment but felt that the case
should have been decided on standing grounds instead, also focused on the
ownership of the cross, rather than on its meaning.140 He opined that the
Government could not be enjoined from “permitting” the display of the
cross unless the Government owned the property on which it stood:
Barring the Government from ‘permitting’ the cross’s display at a particular location makes
sense only if the Government owns the location. As the proprietor, it can remove the cross
that private parties have erected and deny permission to erect another. But if the land is privately owned, the Government can prevent the cross’s display only by making it illegal.141

For at least a majority of the Justices, then, the most important fact in
the case was the private rather than public ownership of the land on which
the cross stood.142 Both Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion and Justice
Scalia’s concurrence evidence an overriding concern with questions of
ownership rather than with questions of meaning.143
This shift in focus, and its concomitant marginalization of the endorsement approach, troubled Justice Stevens, who authored the principal

136

Id. at 1819.
Id.
138 Id. (quoting Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 471 (2009)).
139 Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1819, 1821.
140 Id. at 1824-25 (Scalia, J., concurring).
141 Id. at 1825. As such, Buono could not show that he was injured by the Government’s land
transfer, since had not shown that he was harmed or “offended” by the existence of the cross on private,
rather than public, land. Id. at 1826-27.
142 Id. at 1819 (plurality opinion) (comprising the opinion of Justice Kennedy and Chief Justice
Roberts); id. at 1824 (Alito, J., concurring); id. at 1825 (Scalia, J., concurring) (joined by Justice Thomas).
143 Id. at 1819 (plurality opinion) (comprising the opinion of Justice Kennedy and Chief Justice
Roberts); id. at 1825 (Scalia, J., concurring) (joined by Justice Thomas).
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dissent in the case.144 For Justice Stevens, the issue before the Supreme
Court was essentially the same as the question that was at issue throughout
the litigation: whether the Government’s actions—including the action of
attempting to transfer the one-acre plot of land to a private party—resulted
in an impermissible endorsement of religion.145 “In evaluating a claim that
the Government would impermissibly ‘permit’ the cross’s display by effecting a transfer,” Justice Stevens therefore explained, “a court cannot start
from a baseline in which the cross has already been transferred.”146 In other
words, Justice Stevens contended, the Court should not have based its decision merely on the public or private ownership at the time of decision.147
Rather, it should have considered whether the transfer would cure or continue the already-adjudicated Establishment Clause violation.148
Although Justice Stevens’s dissent did discuss the cross’s ownership,
along with the indicia of continuing governmental control over the cross
despite its transfer, he considered those facts only insofar as they were relevant to an understanding of the social meaning of the Government’s actions.149 Thus, he argued that once the cross had been designated a national
memorial, “changing the identity of the owner of the underlying land could
no longer change the public or private character of the cross. The Government has expressly adopted the cross as its own.”150 And of course, what the
Government has adopted is a religious message: “We have recognized the
significance of the Latin cross as a sectarian symbol, and no participant in
this litigation denies that the cross bears that social meaning. Making a
plain, unadorned Latin cross a war memorial does not make the cross secular. It makes the war memorial sectarian.”151 Justice Stevens distinguished
144 Id. at 1828-42 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (joined by Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor). Justice
Breyer dissented separately on the ground that the case involved no substantial constitutional issues but
rather revolved around the simple question of whether the district court had the power to interpret its
own injunction as it did and to enforce that injunction as it saw fit—a question of the law of remedies.
Id. at 1842-44. According to Justice Breyer, that question clearly should have been answered in the
affirmative. Id. at 1845.
145 Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1828 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
146 Id. at 1831.
147 Id. at 1841.
148 Id. at 1837. An analogous case to Buono is Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971), in which
the Supreme Court held that the decision by the City of Jackson, Mississippi to close its public swimming pools rather than to operate them on a racially integrated basis did not violate the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 219. The Court decided that the City’s decision to close the
pools and even to transfer at least one of them to a private entity, to be operated on a segregated basis,
did not implicate the City itself in any racially discriminatory action; thus, the private ownership of the
pools became the dispositive factor. Id. at 222-23. Justice White’s dissent in that case, by contrast,
argued that the closing and the transfer of the pools should be viewed in a broader context, taking into
account the City’s apparent discriminatory motivations. Id. at 254-55 (White, J., dissenting).
149 See, e.g., Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1834-35 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
150 Id. at 1834.
151 Id. at 1835 (footnotes omitted).
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Pinette on the ground that the government action in that case, unlike in
Buono, showed no favoritism toward religion.152 Because the contemplated
private ownership of the patch of land in the national preserve was not a
dispositive fact for Justice Stevens, he could ultimately conclude that
“[c]hanging the ownership status of the underlying land . . . would not
change the fact that the cross conveys a message of government endorsement of religion.”153
C.

Summum and Buono Compared

Summum and Buono treat distinct doctrinal issues. Summum was a free
speech challenge, while Buono was an Establishment Clause case.154 As
such, the principal question in Summum was whether the city park was a
speech forum—and if so, what kind of forum—or whether it constituted
government speech immune to Free Speech Clause attack.155 In Buono, by
contrast, the issue was whether the cross display in the Mojave National
Preserve impermissibly endorsed religion, in violation of the Establishment
Clause.156
But in several very important ways, Summum and Buono are closely
related. At base, both cases arose out of an act of exclusion. In Summum,
the challenge arose from the city’s exclusion of the Seven Aphorisms monument from its park, and in Buono, the government’s refusal to permit a
Buddhist shrine to be erected at Sunrise Rock initially set in motion the
litigation that ensued.157 Though one case was styled as a free speech case
and the other as an Establishment Clause case, both concerned the government’s ability to exclude some religious speech and to adopt other facially
religious speech as its own.158 In addition, in both cases, the First Amendment issues were resolved by reference to property and ownership, both
literal and metaphorical, of symbolic speech.159 In Buono, the plurality
viewed the actual ownership of the plot of land on which the cross stood as
central to the case, and possibly dispositive of the Establishment Clause

152

Id. at 1836.
Id. at 1837.
154 Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 464 (2009); Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1812 (plurality opinion).
155 Summum, 555 U.S. at 464.
156 Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1811-12 (plurality opinion).
157 Summum, 555 U.S. at 465; see also B. Jessie Hill, Property and the Public Forum: An Essay on
Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, 6 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 49, 52 (2010).
158 Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1834 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Summum, 555 U.S. at 473-74 (arguing that,
although the City adopted ownership of the Ten Commandments monument, for instance, it did not
thereby adopt a single meaning or symbolism for that monument).
159 Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1819 (plurality opinion); Summum, 555 U.S. at 470-72.
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claim.160 In Summum, the city’s proprietary relationship to the Ten Commandments monument and other monuments in Pioneer Park was also seen
as directing the outcome of the case.161 In both literally and symbolically
“owning” that speech, the city assumed the right to exclude Summum’s
desired message from a public place.162 The central place that ownership
occupies in these two cases is reflected, moreover, in the cases’ rhetoric,
referring to the government with the privatizing term “property owner,” for
example.163
Finally, although in one case the Court was setting aside questions
about endorsement and in the other it was setting aside questions about
viewpoint discrimination, in both cases it used formalistic, conceptual reasoning to do so.164 In turning speech into a form of property and casting the
government in the role of private property owner, the Court gave the government absolute power to control the constitutionality of its actions, merely by engaging in particular property transactions.165
II.

DOCTRINAL DEAD ENDS AND COUNTING HEADS: SOME POSSIBLE
EXPLANATIONS FOR SUMMUM AND BUONO

Each of the cases just discussed is somewhat idiosyncratic—Buono
because of its convoluted history of property transactions and Summum
because of its free speech posture that hints at but expressly disclaims an
Establishment Clause problem.166 Despite their uniqueness, however, both
the “government speech” category embraced in Summum and the property
transfer remedy sanctioned in Buono may well have lives that extend beyond those individual cases. For instance, in a related context, Professor
160

Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1819 (plurality opinion).
Summum, 555 U.S. at 472-74.
162 Id. at 470-71.
163 See Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1819 (plurality opinion) (“‘[P]ersons who observe donated monuments
routinely—and reasonably—interpret them as conveying some message on the property owner’s behalf.’” (quoting Summum, 555 U.S. at 471)).
164 See, e.g., id. (treating the fact that the Latin cross stood on private land as virtually dispositive
of the Establishment Clause); Summum, 555 U.S. at 481 (concluding that selecting certain monuments
to include on public land is a form of government speech, not a form of censoring individuals’ free
speech).
165 Cf. Zick, supra note 27, at 1396 (discussing several Establishment Clause cases involving
settlement of constitutional issues through property disposition and reading the Buono plurality as giving “strong hints . . . that at least three [J]ustices are inclined to treat property dispositions deferentially,
even in a case bearing some unusual indicia of favoritism toward a religious symbol”).
166 Buono involved a dispute over a land-transfer statute, which had permitted the government to
grant the land where the cross stood to the Veterans of Foreign Wars and to receive private land to offset
the value of the transferred land. Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1813 (plurality opinion); see also Summum, 555
U.S. at 482 (Scalia, J., concurring) (suggesting that although he agreed with the Court’s holding, the
Court did not fully address the petitioner’s Establishment Clause claim).
161
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Helen Norton has observed that lower courts have tended to take the Supreme Court’s broad understanding of public employee speech as government speech set forth in Garcetti v. Ceballos167 and run with it, often applying it in factual settings where its relevance is less than obvious.168 In addition, the Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Christian Legal Society v.
Martinez,169 rejecting a religious student group’s claims for inclusion among
a public law school’s official sanctioned student organizations, may be understood as another iteration of the Court’s approach in Summum and Buono. In that case, the Court applied the “limited-public-forum” doctrine to
sideline the Christian Legal Society’s (“CLS”) free speech and free association claims.170 The Court’s use of property concepts—particularly in its
unprecedented application of forum doctrine to the CLS’s claim that the
law school’s actions burdened its freedom of association—was not required
by precedent, and it functioned to conceal or subsume difficult questions
about the meanings of pluralism and equality by appearing to resolve the
case on cut-and-dried private law concepts.171
The primary focus of this Article is therefore on the troubling implications of importing property rhetoric into the case law dealing with religious
symbolism. It is nonetheless helpful, in considering the future implications
of Summum and Buono, to understand the possible reasons why the cases
were decided as they were.
The first and perhaps most obvious explanation for the configuration
of the Supreme Court’s most recent religious symbolism cases is the retirement of Justice O’Connor in 2006. Justice O’Connor was the creator and
most fervent supporter of the endorsement test.172 Although O’Connor’s test
managed to command a majority in the key religious symbolism cases, as
the above discussion demonstrates, the majorities were fragile and fragmented, often composed of a mere five Justices, some of whom were writing in dissent.173 In the wake of O’Connor’s departure, commentators have
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547 U.S. 410 (2006).
Helen Norton, Constraining Public Employee Speech: Government’s Control of Its Workers’
Speech to Protect Its Own Expression, 59 DUKE L.J. 1, 4 (2009) [hereinafter Norton, Constraining
Public Employee Speech]; Helen Norton, Imaginary Threats to Government’s Expressive Interests, 61
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1265, 1267-68 (2011) [hereinafter Norton, Imaginary Threats].
169 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010).
170 Id. at 2993-94.
171 Hill, supra note 157, at 51.
172 See, e.g., Adam M. Samaha, Endorsement Retires: From Religious Symbols to Anti-Sorting
Principles, 2005 SUP. CT. REV. 135, 137.
173 See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 593-594 (1989); see id. at 623-37
(O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); id. at 637-646 (Brennan, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); id. at 646-655 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at
655-679 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment, concurring in part, and dissenting in part); see also
Erwin Chemerinsky, The Future of Constitutional Law, 34 CAP. U. L. REV. 647, 665 & n.126 (2006).
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widely, if prematurely, pronounced the death of the endorsement test.174
Justice O’Connor was, of course, replaced by Justice Alito, who wrote the
majority opinion in Summum and who joined Justice Kennedy’s plurality
opinion in Buono almost in its entirety.175 Thus, one might argue, the only
thing that changed in any meaningful way between Van Orden and Summum was the Court personnel—but it was a change that, unsurprisingly,
turned out to have significant implications for the ways in which Establishment Clause challenges would subsequently be decided.176 The dissents
in Buono and concurrences in Summum, composed in part of those Justices
who were formerly part of the majority applying the endorsement analysis
in religious symbolism cases, thus persisted in focusing on questions of
social meaning and the viewpoint of the reasonable observer rather than
embracing the property law paradigm.177
At the same time, it is somewhat surprising that the Court did not
wholeheartedly adopt a coercion standard in Buono. As many commentators have observed, there are likely five votes for adopting Justice Kennedy’s preferred, and more stringent, standard, according to which a government action does not violate the Establishment Clause unless it constitutes
(physical or psychological) coercion or proselytizing.178 That standard probably would have resulted in Buono being decided the same way, but it
would have kept the focus of the Court’s inquiry on social meaning—

174

See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 173, at 665-66; Samaha, supra note 172, at 137; Gary J.
Simson, Beyond Interstate Recognition in the Same-Sex Marriage Debate, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 313,
379-80 (2006).
175 See Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1821 (Alito, J., concurring) (stating that he concurred with the majority
in all but one respect); Lisa Shaw Roy, Pleasant Grove City v. Summum: Monuments, Messages, and
the Next Establishment Clause, 104 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 280, 289 (2010).
176 See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 173, at 664-66 (predicting that Justice O’Connor’s replacement by Justice Alito was likely to make a difference in Establishment Clause cases); cf. Roy, supra
note 175, at 289 (“Nor should it be lost on the reader that the author of the majority opinion in Summum,
Justice Alito, assumed Justice O’Connor’s seat on the Court, which has both symbolic and practical
implications.”). Of course, Chief Justice Rehnquist was also replaced by Chief Justice Roberts during
the period between Van Orden and Summum, but that change did not appear to have any meaningful
impact on the pattern of decision making in religious symbolism cases.
177 See Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1830-33 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (joined by Justices Ginsburg and
Sotomayor) (arguing that the plurality should have considered whether the transfer of the land itself
perpetuated the already-adjudicated Establishment Clause violation); see also Pleasant Grove City v.
Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 481-82 (2009) (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting, in an opinion joined by Justice
Ginsburg, that the City’s acceptance of a monument could be viewed as implicit endorsement of the
monument’s message); id. at 487 (Souter, J., concurring) (suggesting that the relevant inquiry should
focus on how the reasonable observer would attribute the speech).
178 See Chemerinsky, supra note 173, at 665 (opining that Justice Kennedy is one of five Justices
likely in favor of “adopting a view that the government violates the Establishment Clause only if it
literally establishes a church or coerces religious participation”); see also Simson, supra note 174, at
379-81.
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requiring the Court to ask whether the cross’s message was coercive or
proselytizing—rather than on ownership.179
A second pragmatic explanation for why these cases were decided as
they were concerns the rather peculiar factual backdrops of both cases. The
oddity of Summum lay in the religious sect’s request to be included in a
public park not on a transient basis by means of an ephemeral speech or
temporary holiday display, for example, but by being allowed to erect a
large, permanent monument. The sheer practicalities of the situation—the
unsavory possibility, if Summum’s request were granted, of opening up a
public park to physical overcrowding by a cacophony of monuments—
seemed to dictate the result in that case.180 One might then speculate that the
Court reached whatever doctrinal lengths were necessary in order to avoid
this bizarre and counterintuitive result.181 And as noted above, the fact that
the case arose as a Free Speech Clause challenge rather than in the usual
Establishment Clause posture certainly accounted for the Court’s decision
not to discuss questions of endorsement and social meaning in any direct
way. Likewise, Buono was characterized by a complex and distracting factual and procedural history that both provided a number of alternate bases
on which the case could be decided and made the determination of social
meaning complex, to say the least. For this reason, a number of commentators predicted that the Supreme Court would decide the Buono case without
seriously addressing the underlying Establishment Clause merits, which is
exactly what it did.182
Third, Summum and Buono can be seen as the end result of a doctrinal
mess thirty years in the making. Ever since the Court first permitted religious speech in the public square, beginning with Lynch v. Donnelly’s sanctioning of a crèche display at Christmastime, it seemed virtually inevitable
that more and more religious voices would seek entry to that space, until

179 See generally B. Jessie Hill, Of Christmas Trees and Corpus Christi: Ceremonial Deism and
Change in Meaning over Time, 59 DUKE L.J. 705, 728 (2010) (discussing the relationship between the
coercion test and the endorsement test); see also generally Mark Strasser, The Coercion Test: On Prayer, Offense, and Doctrinal Inculcation, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 417, 431-33 (2009) (discussing the coercion
test as applied in the context of symbolic speech).
180 See Summum, 555 U.S. at 478-80 (referring to the space for different monuments in public
parks as “limited”).
181 See Liptak, supra note 96 (noting that at oral argument “the [J]ustices were finding it hard to
identify a principle that would compel the city to accept the Summum monument without creating havoc
in public parks around the nation” and describing such questions asked by the Justices as, “‘You have a
Statue of Liberty . . . . Do we have to have a statue of despotism? Or do we have to put any president
who wants to be on Mount Rushmore?’” (quoting Chief Justice Roberts)).
182 The Buono plurality did not directly decide what implications the land transfer would have for
the Establishment Clause claim but rather remanded to the lower court for further proceedings. Buono,
130 S. Ct. at 1820-21 (plurality opinion). Justice Scalia felt that the case should have been decided on
standing grounds, and Justice Breyer would have decided it as a matter of the law of remedies, not as a
matter of constitutional law. Id. at 1824 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 1842-43 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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there was simply no more room.183 Once the First Amendment was understood not to banish religious speech but simply to mandate equal treatment
among speakers, one might argue, the flood of claims for equal treatment
was inevitable.184 Thus, for example, in the years after the Supreme Court’s
decision in Lynch, the Chabad-Lubavitch movement sought repeatedly to
place menorah displays in prominent public places in various cities during
the winter holiday season.185 A number of these displays became the subject
of litigation; the most famous was the menorah in Allegheny, but several
cases also involved Free Speech Clause challenges to the exclusion of menorahs from prominent public places.186 The Summum religion, too, fought
and won on free speech grounds some cases involving access to public fora.187
Summum thus represents a very concrete example of the crowding of
the public sphere with religious voices demanding official recognition. But
even in a less literally crowded public space, there are surely limits to the
amount and types of religious speech a government is willing and able to
include. There are only so many temporary holiday displays that can fit
around the state capitol and only so many days on which a legislative prayer can be offered. Consequently, the Court had to reintroduce some boundaries, either by means of the government speech doctrine, which would allow the government to repossess the public space and thereby prevent it
183 See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 702 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (writing that, in the
wake of the Court’s decision to permit a crèche to remain in a municipal display, “Jews and other nonChristian groups . . . can be expected to press government for inclusion of their symbols, and . . . [the]
government will have to become involved in accommodating the various demands”).
184 “If there is room at the public forum for the Good News Club, there must also be room for
Summum.” Ian Bartrum, Pleasant Grove v. Summum: Losing the Battle to Win the War, 95 VA. L. REV.
IN BRIEF 43, 46 (2009).
185 See Chabad of S. Ohio & Congregation Lubavitch v. City of Cincinnati, 363 F.3d 427, 430 (6th
Cir. 2004); Chabad-Lubavitch of Ga. v. Miller, 5 F.3d 1383, 1385 (11th Cir. 1993); Chabad-Lubavitch
of Vt. v. City of Burlington, 936 F.2d 109, 111 (2d Cir. 1991) (per curiam); Lubavitch Chabad House,
Inc. v. City of Chicago, 917 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1990).
186 County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989); see also, e.g., Chabad of S. Ohio, 363
F.3d at 430 (holding that Chabad had a likelihood of success on the merits of its claim that its exclusion
from a public square during the winter holiday season violated its free speech rights); Chabad-Lubavitch
of Ga., 5 F.3d at 1385 (holding that Chabad had a free speech right to maintain a menorah display in the
state capitol during the holiday season). But see Chabad-Lubavitch of Vt., 936 F.2d at 110-12 (upholding City of Burlington’s denial of a permit to displaying Chabad’s menorah in a city park, reasoning that
the display would violate the Establishment Clause); Lubavitch Chabad House, 917 F.2d at 347-48
(upholding the exclusion of Chabad’s menorah from O’Hare International Airport as a reasonable time,
place, or manner restriction, despite the presence of city-owned Christmas trees).
187 See, e.g., Summum v. City of Ogden, 297 F.3d 995, 1011 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding that the
City of Ogden “cannot display the Ten Commandments Monument while declining to display the
[Summum] Seven Principles Monument” consistent with the Free Speech Clause); Summum v. Callaghan, 130 F.3d 906, 910, 921 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that Summum had stated a claim for denial of its
free speech rights by being denied permission to erect its monolith on the county courthouse lawn
alongside the Ten Commandments).
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from being overcrowded with too many speakers, or by privatizing the
property at issue, thereby cutting off the governmental connection to the
alleged discrimination among speakers. In either case, a solution had to be
found to allow some form of discrimination among, and exclusion of, religious voices, since including every religious speaker is simply impossible
as a practical matter.188
At the same time, as some commentators have observed, the government’s ownership of religious speech creates a new problem—the appearance that the government is endorsing that religious speech whenever it
takes ownership of it.189 For this reason, it perhaps made sense for the Court
to marginalize the endorsement test. In Summum, the Court suggested that
there was a difference between government speech and government endorsement of speech, by allowing that the government could be speaking
through its monuments without speaking the actual words contained on the
monuments.190 And in Buono, the Court allowed the government to avoid
the implications of its ownership of a Latin cross by alienating that property.191 Property law presented a way out of the doctrinal mess the Court itself
had created.
Finally, there is one more possibility that bears consideration: that the
Supreme Court’s turn to property stemmed from a genuine desire to minimize the conflict that arguably arises from or is aggravated by the endorsement/equality approach to religious symbols.192 It seems that the level of
emotional investment that attaches to cases involving religious symbolism,
the intense criticism of the Court’s jurisprudence in this domain, and the
volume of the debate concerning the constitutionality of religious symbols
in public places has only increased rather than decreased since the Court
entered the fray.193 As such, it would certainly be reasonable for the Court
to believe that it only makes things worse when it issues pronouncements
on the social meaning of religious symbols and whether they belong in the
public square. Professor and former Judge Michael McConnell suggests, for
example, that “cultural and political polarization” based on religion has
increased in recent years, and that the Court may be “perceiv[ing] that public passions are aroused more by the Supreme Court’s endorsement of one
position and repudiation of the other than by the ostensible subjects of the
dispute.”194 Indeed, McConnell further ventures that “few people care much
188

Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 478-80 (2009).
Bartrum, supra note 184, at 46-47; Meyler, supra note 42, at 107.
190 Summum, 555 U.S. at 476-77.
191 Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1811 (2010) (plurality opinion).
192 The author is indebted to several people for encouraging her to examine this possibility, especially Jonathan Varat and Scott Burris.
193 See supra notes 4-12, 20, and accompanying text.
194 Michael W. McConnell, The Influence of Cultural Conflict on the Jurisprudence of the Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment, in LAW AND RELIGION IN THEORETICAL AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT
100, 120, 122 (Peter Cane, Carolyn Evans & Zoë Robinson eds., 2008).
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whether a seldom-seen monument on a county courthouse lawn contains a
copy of the Ten Commandments, but many people care very much whether
the Supreme Court says such a display is consistent with our constitutional
values.”195 The use of property principles thus provides a convenient but
still legally defensible way for the Court to avoid magnifying the cultural
tensions provoked by religious symbolism cases: if it decides those cases on
property grounds, it need not address difficult and contentious questions
about the meaning of a particular symbol and how much government sponsorship of religious speech is too much for a pluralistic democracy to permit.
This last possibility—that the recent cases are an effort to lower the
temperature of the debate—may well offer the best explanation for the
Court’s decision making of late. As discussed at greater length below,196
however, it is not a satisfying answer to the conundrum highlighted by this
Article. Although the Court’s treatment of religious symbolism cases may
aggravate disputes that began as marginal or minor, it cannot be said to
have created them. The disputes reach the courts because parties bring them
there. Though there is a danger that courts will only make matters worse in
articulating legal resolutions to those disputes, there is also a danger that
courts’ refusal to intervene or to make pronouncements regarding the constitutional values that are truly at stake in a given case will simply render
the harm arising from the display—the harm that gave rise to the plaintiff’s
claim—all the more invisible. Though in some cases, perhaps, the turn to
property may defuse the dispute with almost Solomonic cleverness, in some
cases, no doubt, the harm, and the complaint it created, will be submerged
but not eradicated.
There are thus a number of pragmatic reasons that may explain why
the Summum and Buono cases were decided as they were, making them
unsurprising if ill-fitting additions to the sequence of religious symbolism
cases in the Supreme Court. Even if predictable and in some sense justifiable, however, the turn that the Court has taken in its rhetoric and reasoning
has troubling implications. The following Section demonstrates that the
property rhetoric of Summum and Buono is a particularly inappropriate
overlay to Establishment Clause doctrine.
III. PROBLEMS WITH THE PRIVATE PROPERTY PARADIGM
This Part presents a critique of the Court’s decision to embrace a particular version of property law and language in Summum and Buono—
modeled on the notion of private property as exclusion. Of course, to some
degree, the concepts of property and ownership are always involved when a
195
196

Id. at 122.
See infra Part III.B.2.
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legal challenge is presented to a religious display attributed to the government. Therefore, Part III.A examines the relationship among the concepts
of endorsement, attribution, and ownership, highlighting the way in which
the Court’s opinion in Summum exploits the distinction between ownership
and attribution in a way that favors the property perspective but undermines
the goals of the government speech doctrine.
Next, Part III.B considers in detail the reasons why it is unwise for the
Court to adopt this particular version of property rhetoric and principles in
the religious symbolism context. That Part argues that property law’s apparent appeal as a neutral, clear, and formalistic approach to deciding difficult constitutional cases actually has very little to recommend it. Worse, the
language of private-property-as-exclusion introduces into the doctrine a
potential for legitimizing the subordination of minority religious speakers
by the government. In addition, the government’s expressive possession of
Christian religious symbols acts to construct the community as an openly
Christian one, in which non-Christians and nonadherents are, at worst, unwelcome outsiders and, at best, tolerated guests.
A.

Endorsement, Attribution, and Ownership

The very concept of attribution, which itself is central to both the endorsement analysis and the government speech defense, incorporates a notion of ownership—or at a minimum, of control. A party cannot endorse a
message without somehow claiming it as its own, usually by means of exercising some measure of ownership or control over the message. Whether
one is attempting to discern endorsement or ownership, the issue appears to
turn on the relationship to a symbolic object. The concepts are therefore
closely affiliated. Indeed, although this Article argues that the Supreme
Court’s turn to property in its religious symbolism cases is a relatively new
phenomenon, it is also possible that the Court did not discuss the ownership
of the symbolic speech in any meaningful way in older cases like Lynch,
Allegheny, Van Orden, or McCreary because the symbol’s ownership—its
attribution to the government—simply was not contested in those cases.
This Section therefore explores in greater depth the relationship of ownership to the concept of endorsement. Ultimately, while property rights and
questions of ownership are inextricably linked with free speech concerns as
well as Establishment Clause concerns pertaining to religious speech, ownership and endorsement are distinct concepts. The Court both recognized
and exploited this distinction in Summum, with questionable results.197
In applying the endorsement test to determine the constitutionality of a
religious display, a court is required, implicitly, to make two determinations: first, whether the display’s message endorses religion; and second,
197

Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 473-74 (2009).
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whether that message of religious endorsement can be attributed to the government.198 In early cases like Lynch and Allegheny, the focus was primarily
on the first question.199 In Lynch and Allegheny, the Justices divided primarily over their evaluation of the displays’ context and the social meaning
they drew therefrom; the Court never stopped to question whether the
crèche display in Lynch, for example, was attributable to the government of
Pawtucket, Rhode Island, although it technically stood in a private park.200
As one commentator has pointed out, the city owned the display itself and
took responsibility for erecting and removing the display, thus exercising
“effective control” over the display’s message.201 Indeed, the Court “has
long resisted bright-line rules that would limit [the endorsement test’s] contextual analysis only to those messages that are government owned or controlled.”202 Thus, the Court has clung to the endorsement test when a privately owned symbol stood on government property and when a publicly
owned and erected display occupied private property.203
In more recent years, however, the second question—the problem of
attribution—has garnered significant scholarly attention, particularly in
light of the rise of the government speech doctrine.204 In the wake of percolating lower-court debates over the constitutionality of specialty license
plate schemes as well as of the Summum case, much of this scholarship has
focused on determining when the government should be able to claim
speech as its own, thereby insulating that speech from challenge under the
First Amendment’s free speech protections.205 Commentators have also
considered when the government must take responsibility for speech, thus

198 Cf. Dolan, Government Identity Speech, supra note 114, at 24 (“Establishment Clause claims in
religious display cases generally require two conditions: a given display conveys a religious message,
and the government (usually along with a private party) has some role.”). In theory, the Establishment
Clause could also be violated by a message of governmental disapproval of religion. See, e.g., Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
199 See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 592 (1989); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 681, 683.
200 Haupt, supra note 104, at 606.
201 Id. at 606-07.
202 The Supreme Court, 2009 Term—Leading Cases: Endorsement Test, 124 HARV. L. REV. 219,
219 (2010).
203 Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 579, 597; Lynch, 465 U.S. at 671, 682. In American Atheists, Inc. v.
Davenport, the Tenth Circuit declined to hold that a privately owned Latin cross on private property
bearing the symbol of a public agency was immune from Establishment Clause challenge simply by
virtue of the private object-private land combination. 637 F.3d 1095, 1121 n.12 (10th Cir. 2010), cert.
denied sub nom. Utah Highway Patrol Ass’n v. Am. Atheists, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 12 (2011).
204 See, ex., Abner S. Greene, (Mis)attribution, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 833, 833 (2010); Haupt, supra
note 104, at 594; Note, Three’s a Crowd—Defending the Binary Approach to Government Speech, 124
HARV. L. REV. 805, 805 (2011) [hereinafter Three’s a Crowd].
205 See, e.g., Haupt, supra note 104, at 575; Helen Norton, The Measure of Government Speech:
Identifying Expression’s Source, 88 B.U. L. REV. 587, 591-92 (2008); Olree, supra note 107, at 373;
Three’s a Crowd, supra note 204, at 805, 809.
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opening itself to Establishment Clause challenges.206 Scholars such as Claudia Haupt, Professor Helen Norton, and Professor Andy Olree have proposed tests for identifying speech as governmental.207 Relatedly, Professor
Caroline Mala Corbin has argued that courts should recognize a distinct
category of “mixed speech,” which has elements of both private and governmental control.208 In the analyses of these commentators, as well as of
lower courts that have struggled to find a systematic approach to determining responsibility for speech, actual ownership of either the symbols or the
property on which they stand is often a factor, but not a dispositive one.209
Ownership and attribution, in other words, are related but not necessarily
identical.
Recent work by Professor Abner Greene, moreover, demonstrates that
the relationship between a government “speaker” and a particular message
may take a wide variety of forms.210 For example, sometimes the government provides “platforms” for private speech with which it does not necessarily wish to associate itself, but for which it appears to retain some responsibility.211 An example might be a specialty license plate program, or
an adopt-a-highway program.212 In those instances, Professor Greene has
argued that the government should have discretion to decline a platform for
certain kinds of speech, such as speech that is hateful or vulgar; yet, the fact
“[t]hat the state may be selectively advancing a contested view of the good
does not entail that it is adopting the speech as its own, nor that it is correct
to attribute the speech to the state.”213

206

Haupt, supra 104, at 572-73.
Haupt, supra note 104, at 575 (“effective control”); Norton, supra note 205, at 591-92; Olree,
supra note 107, at 373.
208 Caroline Mala Corbin, Mixed Speech: When Speech Is Both Private and Governmental, 83
N.Y.U. L. REV. 605, 610 (2008). Professor Caroline Mala Corbin suggests that claims of viewpoint
discrimination with respect to mixed speech should invoke intermediate scrutiny; she also implies that
such speech would be attributable to the government for Establishment Clause purposes. Id. at 675-80
(advocating for intermediate scrutiny); id. at 689-91 (stating that government may discriminate against
mixed religious speech in order to avoid Establishment Clause problems).
209 For Claudia Haupt, ownership of the property may play a role in determining the entity to
which a reasonable observer would attribute a religious message. She specifically eschews such “categorical” approaches in favor of an examination of “effective control.” Haupt, supra note 104, at 593601. Professor Helen Norton treats the public or private ownership of the property on which the speech
occurs as a relevant “cue” to the proper attribution. Norton, supra note 205, at 608. Professor Andy
Olree uses the ownership or control of the “medium or format” of the speech as one of three questions to
ask in attributing speech. Olree, supra note 107, at 411. Professor Olree also notes that most lower
courts have followed a four-pronged test for determining whether speech is governmental or private, and
that actual ownership of the speech does not carry independent weight. Id. at 386, 398.
210 Abner S. Greene, Speech Platforms, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1253, 1253-54 (2011).
211 Id. at 1255-56.
212 Id. at 1257.
213 Id. at 1255; see also Greene, supra note 204, at 848.
207

2013]

(DIS)OWNING RELIGIOUS SPEECH

393

This scholarship highlights the fact that the relationship between
speech and a governmental or private “speaker” is not always a straightforward one, determined with simple reference to ownership of the locus or
apparatus of speech.214 To borrow from the terminology of philosophy of
language, endorsement is but one of many “speech acts” that a speaker may
perform.215 It is one of many possible relationships between the speaker and
the symbolic object. Depending on the context, the speech act may, instead,
be one of referring to or commemorating a historical event;216 of acknowledging or giving thanks for a contribution;217 or even of “quoting” a private
speaker’s speech by bracketing or distancing the message itself in favor of
inclusion based on some other principle—such as when a government entity
opens a library, operates a public forum for free speech, or selects works of
art for a publicly owned museum.218 The nature of the speech act depends
on the context of the speech, which may consist of a large—even limitless—number of factors.219 For this reason, though property ownership is
inextricably interwoven with the problem of attribution and of the social
meaning of a display, it is not always identical to, nor coextensive with,
either meaning or attribution.
In Summum, Justice Alito exploited this distinction, discussing the relationship between attribution and ownership at some length.220 He began
by noting that the government’s ownership of the park and acceptance of
the privately donated monuments therein tended to indicate that the monuments were the government’s own speech: “It certainly is not common for
property owners to open up their property for the installation of permanent
monuments that convey a message with which they do not wish to be associated.”221 As such, in general, monuments, whether commissioned by the
214

Greene, supra note 204, at 850.
In other work, the author has used philosophy of language to illuminate problems associated
with religious speech and the endorsement test. Hill, supra note 49, at 511-12; Hill, supra note 179, at
731-32.
216 An example might be a monument that recognizes the role of a particular religious or missionary group in a city’s founding.
217 Cf. Norton, supra note 205, at 622 (discussing acknowledgement of a private entity’s contribution as expressive behavior).
218 Cf. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 476 n.5 (“Museums display works of art
that express many different sentiments, and the significance of a donated work of art to its creator or
donor may differ markedly from a museum’s reasons for accepting and displaying the work. For example, a painting of a religious scene may have been commissioned and painted to express religious
thoughts and feelings. Even if the painting is donated to the museum by a patron who shares those
thoughts and feelings, it does not follow that the museum, by displaying the painting, intends to convey
or is perceived as conveying the same ‘message.’”).
219 Hill, supra note 49, at 512-13. Professor Abner Greene also refers to “local” or “background”
understandings. Greene, supra note 210, at 1255-56 (“local understandings”); Greene, supra note 204, at
851 (“background understandings”).
220 Summum, 555 U.S. at 471-77.
221 Id. at 471.
215
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government or simply accepted by it when offered, “have the effect of conveying a government message, and they thus constitute government
speech.”222
In reaching this conclusion, Justice Alito was undoubtedly aware of
the path he had to negotiate between the Scylla of Summum’s free speech
claim and the Charybdis of a potential, future Establishment Clause claim.
If the Ten Commandments and other monuments in the public park were
not government speech, then the park was a public forum for private
speech, and the city had discriminated against Summum by rejecting its
contribution. But if the Ten Commandments were government speech, then
the city was vulnerable to an Establishment Clause claim that it had openly
endorsed the religious speech contained therein.223 Thus, Justice Alito carefully explained how government speech that is facially religious could
nonetheless fail to be religious speech that is endorsed by the government.224
First, he pointed out that monuments can convey more than one message, and that the meaning of a monument can change over time.225 Additionally, and crucially, he described the act of possessing and placing the
monument on city property as, itself, an expressive act—one that, presumably, expresses a relationship between the government speaker and the
speech.226 He thus recognized that, while the Ten Commandments monument contains facially religious language, the speech act that results from
the particular situation is not necessarily one of endorsement of the monument’s religious message. Indeed, for this reason he also rejected Summum’s argument that, if the City wanted to claim the speech in Pioneer
Park as government speech, it should be required formally to endorse the
speech.227 Instead, his opinion intimated, the actual message or effect is

222

Id. at 472.
Cf. Roy, supra note 175, at 280 (“If Pleasant Grove argued too vigorously the theory that the
existing Ten Commandments monument constitutes the city’s own message, then it risked violating the
Establishment Clause in a follow-up lawsuit based on the same facts. If, on the other hand, Pleasant
Grove attributed the monument’s message to its 1971 donor, then the city would be hard-pressed to
explain why Pioneer Park was not, as Summum claimed, a public forum that must be potentially open to
all monuments without discrimination based on content or viewpoint.” (footnote omitted)).
224 Summum, 555 U.S. at 474.
225 Id.
226 Id. at 476 (“By accepting a privately donated monument and placing it on city property, a city
engages in expressive conduct, but the intended and perceived significance of that conduct may not
coincide with the thinking of the monument’s donor or creator.”); cf. Blocher, supra note 28, at 1438
(observing, by analogy to the law of expressive association, that “the inclusion or exclusion of a person
or thing can itself be an expressive act”); see generally Randall P. Bezanson, Speaking Through Others’
Voices: Authorship, Originality, and Free Speech, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 983, 985-86 (2003) (discussing “speech selection judgments” as expressive acts).
227 Summum, 555 U.S. at 474 (“Respondent seems to think . . . that, if a government entity that
accepts a monument for placement on its property does not formally embrace that message, then the
223
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dependent on various features of the physical, temporal, and social context—including the nature of the space in which the monument is placed
and the other items surrounding it.228 Justice Alito seemed to suggest that
while the message on the Ten Commandments monument itself was explicitly religious (exhorting the reader to, for example, keep holy the Sabbath),
the message conveyed by the city’s placement of the Ten Commandments
in Pioneer Park, along with “a historic granary, a wishing well, the City’s
first fire station, [and] a September 11 monument”229 was more incoherent—perhaps something like, “These are things that are important to the
citizens of Pleasant Grove.”230 Justice Alito therefore seemed to insist that
the city has not automatically endorsed the content of the Ten Commandments monument by accepting ownership of it.
Nonetheless, the Court’s opinion at times suggests that not just the entire Pioneer Park display, but in fact each monument in it, is government
speech. It asserts, for example, that “the City’s intends the monument to
speak on its behalf,” and that “[t]he monuments that are accepted . . . constitute government speech.”231 The Court equivocates somewhat on this point,
however, later asserting that “the City’s decision to accept certain privately
donated monuments while rejecting respondent’s is best viewed as a form
of government speech.”232 The opinion is decidedly indecisive as to what,
exactly, constitutes the speech.233 Still, the overwhelmingly clear message is
this: ownership of speech is distinct from endorsement of a specific message.
The distinction between ownership and attribution that Justice Alito
exploited, however accurate as an abstract matter, is deeply troubling when
placed in the context of government speech doctrine. Government speech,
in Summum, is not so much speech attributable to or endorsed by the government, but rather speech that is, in an almost literal sense, owned by the
government. But it is hard to see the justification for applying the governgovernment has not engaged in expressive conduct. This argument fundamentally misunderstands the
way monuments convey meaning.”).
228 Id. at 476-77. Justice Alito’s view is clearly influenced by the mode of analysis the Court employed in other cases involving religious symbols, such as Lynch v. Donnelly. Elsewhere, the author has
examined the idea of endorsement as a speech act and the importance of context in determining the
message, or effect, of religious displays. See Hill, supra note 49, at 511-17.
229 Summum, 555 U.S. at 464-65.
230 Id. at 467 (discussing how the park coveys an image of the City). Professor Greene might refer
to the City as creating a platform for private speech. Greene, supra note 210, at 1257. Professor Dolan
refers to such speech as “identity speech” and argues that such speech describing a municipality’s identity should be considered to violate the Establishment Clause when it is religious in content, at least in
the absence of any disclaimer. Dolan, Government Identity Speech, supra note 114, at 63-67; cf.
NUSSBAUM, supra note 34, at 264 (noting, of Van Orden v. Perry, that “[i]f there is a common theme in
all the displays, it might be said to be the history and ideals of Texas, as the state explicitly stated”).
231 Summum, 555 U.S. at 472-73 (emphasis added).
232 Id. at 481 (emphasis added).
233 Id. at 472-81.

396

GEO. MASON L. REV.

[VOL. 20:2

ment speech doctrine in such a case—that is, to messages that the government refuses to claim as its own.
Government speech doctrine is generally justified on two instrumental
grounds: first, as a valuable way of providing accurate information to the
public, and second, as a means of informing the public of its governing
body’s viewpoint on certain issues, thus promoting political accountability.234 In the case of the Pioneer Park display (as opposed to public healthrelated communications, for example) the first justification seems irrelevant. The second justification appears more relevant to Summum—the public can vote its representatives out of office if it disagrees with the message
of the monuments in the park—but is severely undermined by Justice
Alito’s approach. First, it is not clear how the goals of government speech
doctrine are supported by qualifying government speech as speech owned
by the government but not always directly attributable to the government.
For political accountability to function, the speech must be attributable to
the government. In addition, Justice Alito’s refusal to specify a specific
message expressed by the government speech—either from the individual
Ten Commandments monument, or from the collection of monuments, or
from the act of selecting particular monuments—similarly undermines the
goals of the government speech doctrine. Neither information sharing nor
political accountability for messages can be achieved when the message
conveyed is itself unclear.
Nonetheless, according to Justice Alito’s view, Pleasant Grove City
obtained the right to exclude other voices, without necessitating any judicial
inquiry into whether the exclusion was impermissibly discriminatory, by
taking ownership of the speech in Pioneer Park while distancing itself from
the resulting message.235 Justice Alito’s particular take on government
speech doctrine in the Summum case thus focuses on ownership rather than
attribution, in direct contrast to the aims of the doctrine itself.236

234 See, e.g., Gia B. Lee, Persuasion, Transparency, and Government Speech, 56 HASTINGS L.J.
983, 994 (2005); Norton, Constraining Public Employee Speech, supra note 168, at 20-23. Regarding
the first justification, Professor Michael Dorf adds the perspective that:

[G]overnments must be permitted to speak freely because government speech is often a form
of government action. Government speaks on issues of public health—for example, by discouraging smoking—as a means of promoting public health; government promotes responsible behavior—such as recycling—through campaigns of public education; and government
builds community by such measures as erecting monuments and curating museums.
Michael C. Dorf, Same-Sex Marriage, Second-Class Citizenship, and Law’s Social Meanings, 97 VA. L.
REV. 1267, 1285 (2011).
235 Summum, 555 U.S. at 473-74.
236 See id.
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A Critique of the Property Framework

So far, this Article has illustrated the way in which the Court has
turned to property concepts in dealing with the thorny First Amendment
questions raised by public displays of religious symbolism. As illustrated
above, there was nothing inevitable about the Court’s choice of framework—the Court could have considered Summum within a viewpoint discrimination paradigm, or it could have adopted a government speech rationale that rendered the inclusion of the Ten Commandments constitutionally problematic. And it could have treated Buono under the endorsement
test, by asking whether the social meaning of the Government’s actions,
including the land transfer, constituted an endorsement of Christianity and a
message of exclusion to nonadherents. Instead, the Court turned to property, both as a legal solution and as a rhetorical framework.237 The Court
treated the literal ownership of the land and symbols as a dispositive factor,
whether the ownership was governmental or private.238 In addition, the language of private property permeates both opinions.239
This Section argues that property—or at least the Court’s particular
property-as-exclusion manifestation of property law and rhetoric240—is a
poor fit with the Supreme Court’s existing Establishment Clause and free
speech doctrines and the ideals of equality, inclusion, and nondiscrimination that they embody.241 Indeed, by shifting the focus in its religious symbolism cases from social meaning and viewpoint discrimination to ownership of speech, the Court not only minimizes the importance of those concepts but also introduces into the case law a perspective that is diametrically
opposed to them.
The private property framework, as it is mobilized by the Court, is
troubling in numerous respects. First, although property law appears to pro237

Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1815-20 (2010) (plurality opinion); Summum, 555 U.S. at

467-81.
238

See Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1815-20 (plurality opinion); see also Summum, 555 U.S. at 467-81.
Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1811-1821 (plurality opinion); Summum, 555 U.S. at 464-81.
240 As noted above, property is not unavoidably associated primarily with exclusion, but propertyas-exclusion is one dominant mode of understanding private property. See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
241 The Court can be considered to have engaged in a form of “constitutional borrowing,” as defined by Professors Nelson Tebbe and Robert Tsai (unless property law is considered an area of nonconstitutional doctrine). See Nelson Tebbe & Robert L. Tsai, Constitutional Borrowing, 108 MICH. L.
REV. 459, 461 (2010) (defining constitutional borrowing as “the practice of importing doctrines, rationales, tropes, or other legal elements from one area of constitutional law into another for persuasive
ends”). Professors Tebbe and Tsai cautiously endorse the practice, but they warn that borrowing can be
unwise, for example, if it results in combining incompatible ideas, is disingenuously selective, or if it
corrupts the doctrine so as to make it unworkable or unstable. Id. at 469-71, 482-84. Arguably, many or
all of those problems are present in the Court’s borrowing of property concepts in the free speech and
Establishment Clause domains.
239
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vide a convenient and noncontroversial set of neutral principles for deciding
difficult controversial cases, that neutrality is largely illusory. The Court’s
use of property law and property-based reasoning, while formalistic and
arguably even simplistic, merely masks enormous complexity rather than
resolving it. In addition, the Court’s use of the law and language of property
is animated by concepts such as exclusion, absolutism, inequality, and hierarchy. Rather than enforcing true neutrality, the property paradigm helps to
reinforce a particular political identity that excludes religious outsiders by
both centralizing and naturalizing the exclusion that lies at the heart of the
concept of property. Consequently, this Article argues that the Court
should, in the future, dispense with the easy device of property law and
rhetoric and instead confront the substantive First Amendment issues raised
by the presence of religious displays in public places. This does not mean
that property must be abandoned or ignored altogether, of course—but
simply that it must be put in its place.
1.

Property and Neutral Principles

Property law must have seemed to the Justices like a desirable way to
resolve the complex issues in Summum and Buono. Rather than requiring
messy inquiry into the heavily context-dependent concept of social meaning242 or the unruly analysis of whether viewpoint discrimination has occurred in a government-sponsored forum, ownership and property appeared
to be neat, formalistic categories.243 If the speech is government speech,
then, according to the understanding of private-property-as-exclusion, the
government has the right to exclude any other speakers, for any reason
whatsoever. If the land on which the cross monument stands is owned by a
private party, not the Government, it raises no Establishment Clause concerns. End of story.244
Summum and Buono are not the only cases in which the Court sought
refuge in property law’s neutral and categorical quality, but with limited

242

See generally Hill, supra note 49 (discussing the difficulties that inhere in any analysis of social
meaning, deriving from the centrality of context to social meaning).
243 See, e.g., Steven G. Gey, Reopening the Public Forum—From Sidewalks to Cyberspace, 58
OHIO ST. L.J. 1535, 1555 (1998) (“The post-Perry public forum doctrine may not be the most fractured
area in modern constitutional law, but it comes close.”); Note, Strict Scrutiny in the Middle Forum, 122
HARV. L. REV. 2140, 2141 (2009) (“[I]n recent years, forum analysis has become a muddled area of
First Amendment jurisprudence.”).
244 It is not difficult, moreover, to see the attraction of the “private law model” for a Court such as
the Roberts Court, which seems to sympathize greatly with the traditional model of adjudication and
valorization of the private law world. See generally Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law
Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1288 (1976) (describing the affiliation between the private law
model of litigation and traditionally conservative political attitudes).
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success. In the 1979 case of Jones v. Wolf,245 the Supreme Court embraced
the concept of “neutral principles” in the context of a church property dispute.246 In that case, the Court faced difficult Establishment Clause and free
exercise issues raised by a dispute over who owned church property after a
schism in a local church.247 The Court purported to avoid all of those issues,
however, by allowing the state courts to apply “neutral principles of law,”
apparently defined as “objective, well-established concepts of trust and
property law familiar to lawyers and judges.”248 Applying those neutral
principles, the Court held, “promise[d] to free civil courts completely from
entanglement in questions of religious doctrine, polity, and practice.”249
Similarly, in Adderley v. Florida,250 the Court purported to apply straightforward trespass principles to hold that the First Amendment did not grant a
right to engage in a civil rights protest on the grounds of a municipal jail:
“Nothing in the Constitution of the United States prevents Florida from
even-handed enforcement of its general trespass statute,” the Court explained.251 “The State, no less than a private owner of property, has power
to preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully
dedicated.”252
The dissent in Jones argued, however, that the turn to purportedly neutral property principles often suppresses or assumes away the underlying
constitutional questions.253 Similarly, the dissent in Adderley complained of
the “violence” done to free speech principles when a case about the right to
protest was “turned into a trespass action.”254 The formalistic language of
the Court’s property analysis conceals difficult balancing questions that do
not lend themselves to straightforward, formalistic analysis. Property rights
simply are not as categorical as they appear, especially when public property is involved. Moreover, as discussed below,255 property law and property
rhetoric is often charged with connotations of exclusion, inequality, and
hierarchy.256
245

443 U.S. 595 (1979).
Id. at 597.
247 Id.
248 Id. at 602-03.
249 Id. at 603.
250 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
251 Id. at 47.
252 Id.
253 Jones, 443 U.S. at 614-16 (Powell, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for leaving unresolved the “basic question” of “which faction should have control of the local church” and “afford[ing]
no guidance as to the constitutional limitations” on the use of neutral principles such as restrictive evidentiary rules).
254 Adderley, 385 U.S. at 52 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
255 See infra Part III.B.2-3.
256 The author has made some of these arguments, in much briefer form, with respect to the use of
forum doctrine in Christian Legal Society v. Martinez. Hill, supra note 157, at 53-56.
246
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Relatedly, the rhetoric of property-as-exclusion tends toward a certain
absolute quality. Although property rights, like every other right, may at
some point be limited or even sacrificed when necessary for the public
good, the language of property-as-exclusion ignores those limits. The most
famous example of this absolutism is Blackstone’s widely cited (if inaccurate) description of property as “that sole and despotic dominion which one
man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe.”257 Blackstonian
ownership, moreover, is almost always configured not just as dominion and
control but as complete dominion and control.258 Consider, for example, the
following language from Chabad of Southern Ohio & Congregation Lubavitch v. City of Cincinnati,259 in which the City of Cincinnati justified its exclusion of a privately owned menorah from a holiday display on the city’s
central public square by claiming that the speech taking place in the square
during the holiday season was government speech.260 The City passed an
ordinance declaring:
The City has an inherent right to control its property, which includes a right to close a previously open forum. During times of exclusive use by the City of Cincinnati, the City will bear
the ultimate responsibility for the content of the display or event. No other party, other than
the City of Cincinnati, may make decisions with regard to any aspect of the event and/or display. No private participation with regard to any aspect of the event and/or display will be
permitted at this time. However, the City may accept donations or funds from other entities
for the event and/or display which is the subject of exclusive use. As a result of its sole responsibility, ownership, management and control by the City of Cincinnati during times of
exclusive use, it is recognized the City is engaging in government speech.261

The City’s repeated use of terms such as “exclusive,” “sole,” and “ultimate,” as well as the unyielding overall tone of its statement, suggest that it
has embraced the view of property rights as absolute dominion.262 The invocation of government speech, which implies the government’s private ownership of speech, produces a sort of totalizing language.263
However, this categorical view of property rights, which makes cases
like Summum and Buono suddenly appear to be clear and easy, turning on
questions of ownership and nothing else, is thoroughly inaccurate. When
public property is involved, at least, the case is considerably more compli257 See 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2; see also FORREST MCDONALD, NOVUS
ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 11 (1985); Joan Williams, The
Rhetoric of Property, 83 IOWA L. REV. 277, 281 (1998).
258 See, e.g., Chabad of S. Ohio & Congregation Lubavitch v. City of Cincinnati, 363 F.3d 427 (6th
Cir. 2004).
259 363 F.3d 427 (6th Cir. 2004).
260 Id. at 433-34.
261 Id. at 431 (quoting CINCINNATI MUN. CODE § 713-1).
262 Id.
263 Id.
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cated. There is a long tradition of case law holding that the government
does not possess an absolute right to exclude speakers from its property,
merely by virtue of its ownership of that property.264 Indeed, the Supreme
Court famously stated in Hague v. CIO:265
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust
for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly,
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use of the
streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities,
rights, and liberties of citizens.266

In so holding, the Court rejected the government’s position, drawn from the
older First Amendment case Davis v. Massachusetts,267 which opined, instead, that public property “was absolutely under the control of the legislature,” and therefore that individuals had no right to use it “except in such
mode and subject to such regulations as the legislature, in its wisdom, may
have deemed proper to prescribe.”268
Of course, there are other ways in which the law limits the government’s power to exclude even in its role as property owner: nonpublic fora,
for example, are subject to rules against viewpoint discrimination.269 The
desegregation of public places limited the rights of governmental property
owners in the interest of equality.270 For this reason, Professor Timothy Zick
has argued, drawing on the language of Hague, that government property
must be held in a sort of metaphorical public trust, “for the benefit of the
public,” such that “public officials owe fiduciary duties of fair dealing,
preservation, and compliance with constitutional covenants.”271 Likewise,
Professor Harry Kalven, Jr., has spoken of a “First Amendment easement”
to use the public streets for expressive purposes.272
And indeed, even private property rights may be limited in the interest
of constitutional values. Civil rights laws requiring equal access to privately
owned accommodations limit private property rights in the interest of
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See, e.g., Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
307 U.S. 496 (1939).
266 Id. at 515.
267 167 U.S. 43 (1897).
268 Id. at 46-47 (quoted in Hague, 307 U.S. at 515).
269 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) (noting that a
governmental entity, “‘like the private owner of property, may legally preserve the property under its
control for the use to which it is dedicated’” (quoting Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch.
Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 390 (1993)), but it may not “exercise viewpoint discrimination, even when the
limited public forum is one of its own creation”).
270 See, e.g., Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000a-6 (2006).
271 Zick, supra note 27, at 1368, 1414.
272 Kalven, supra note 28, at 13.
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equality.273 Moreover, although the First Amendment does not generally
require private property owners to permit private speech on their land, the
Supreme Court has upheld the power of a state supreme court to do just
that.274 In his concurrence in PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins,275 Justice Thurgood Marshall rejected an “overly formalistic view of the relationship between the institution of private ownership of property and the First
Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of speech,” pointing out that commonlaw rights (unlike constitutional rights) are of course subject to legislative
revision.276
Similarly, in Marsh v. Alabama,277 the Court refused to find that a corporation’s ownership of a “company town” meant that Jehovah’s Witnesses
had no First Amendment right to solicit there, stating, “We do not agree
that the corporation’s property interests settle the question.”278 Thus, the
crux of the issue is, and has always been, not whether property law governs,
but rather what substantive principles govern the limitations on the property
owner’s rights. Blackstone notwithstanding, the Court in Marsh went so far
as to affirm that “[o]wnership does not always mean absolute dominion.”279
Nonetheless, in Summum and Buono the Court held that ownership
was essentially dispositive. This formalistic property-based approach was
apparent both in Buono’s view that transfer of title to a private party instantly rendered the Establishment Clause question irrelevant280 and in the
Summum Court’s formalistic and ownership-focused understanding of government speech as speech that is simply owned by the government, regardless of its actual attribution.281 Far from resolving everything, in other
words, the purportedly neutral principles of property law in fact resolve
273 See, e.g., Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000a-6. Of course, the
Civil Rights Act is a statutory enactment, passed pursuant to Congress’s commerce power, not a constitutional rule or an enactment pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment. It therefore does not illustrate
directly the use of constitutional laws to limit property rights, but it does illustrate the non-absolute
quality of property rights.
274 PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 88 (1980).
275 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
276 Id. at 91-93 (Marshall, J., concurring) (quoting Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 542 (1976)
(Marshall, J., dissenting)). Indeed, as Professor Zick has demonstrated, the Court has often shown a
willingness to look beyond formal indicia of ownership when considering the impact of property dispositions on constitutional rights claims. He surveys a series of cases, involving equal protection, free
speech, and the Establishment Clause, in which the Court has looked behind a property transfer to
consider its effects on constitutional liberties. Zick, supra note 27, at 1368-1412.
277 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
278 Id. at 505; see also id. at 504-05 (“[A]n ordinance completely prohibiting the dissemination of
ideas on the city streets can not [sic] be justified on the ground that the municipality holds legal title to
them.”).
279 Id. at 506.
280 Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1819 (2010) (plurality opinion); cf. Palmer v. Thompson,
403 U.S. 217, 222-23 (1971); supra note 148 (discussing Palmer).
281 Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 470 (2009).

2013]

(DIS)OWNING RELIGIOUS SPEECH

403

very little. Moreover, the inaccurate and totalizing view of property in those
cases inevitably minimizes the constitutional values at stake. In treating the
government as a private property owner, the Court completely ignores the
public’s expressive rights and stakes in what is, after all, public property.282
2.

Property, Exclusion, and Inequality

The Supreme Court’s property rhetoric thus draws upon and reinforces
the traditional view that exclusion is at the heart of property. Indeed, as the
preceding discussion has demonstrated, the exercise of property rights in
both cases—taking metaphorical ownership of the monuments’ speech in
Summum and transferring literal ownership of the cross to a private party in
Buono—resulted in the exclusion of particular undesired speakers or all
other potential undesired speakers.283 The litigation, in both cases, was born
of an act of governmental exclusion of a religious minority speaker, and
that exclusion was upheld as valid in each case.284 An exclusion-based understanding of property is not the only possible one, of course; as explained
above, many commentators, along with much Supreme Court precedent,
recognize that property must be understood as fundamentally inclusive, and
as serving other, more public values.285 The exclusion-based understanding
of property is the one that drives the Court’s language and rhetoric in Summum and Buono, however.
This particular concept of property is intimately associated with hierarchy and inequality. Consider, for example, the feudal origins of the modern private property regime. In feudal times, the sovereign owned all property, and thus all interests in property derived from the sovereign.286 One’s
ownership of an interest in property therefore signified one’s relationship to
the sovereign—in short, one’s social and political status.287 This association
between property and status was magnified, moreover, by the fact that an
ownership interest in property generally meant a right to the income derived
from the labor of others who, by their lesser wealth and lower social status,
were required to work on the land.288 Even today, one might argue, as did
Professor Morris Cohen, that dominion over things (in the form of property)
also entails power over other human beings, because property law allows us
to exclude others from the things that they need, compelling them to pro282

Cf. Zick, supra note 27, at 1414.
Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1819 (plurality opinion); Summum, 555 U.S. at 473.
284 See supra text accompanying notes 96-143.
285 See supra note 23.
286 See PENNER, supra note 23, at 212. Forrest McDonald contends that this view still persisted in
seventeenth- and eighteenth-century England and influenced, if only negatively, the American conception of property. MCDONALD, supra note 257, at 11-12.
287 See PENNER, supra note 23, at 212-15.
288 See id. at 212-13.
283
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vide their labor in order to obtain those necessities.289 Thus, private property’s origin is, in part, a signifier of hierarchy and one’s place within it.
Of course, in some ways, in America, property came to represent just
the opposite of what it represented in the feudal system. Professor Joseph
Singer has argued, for example, that property law is the “infrastructure of
democracy”;290 that property, regulation, and equal opportunity are of one
piece.291 Others have pointed to the fact that property rights and civil liberties, rather than existing in irresolvable tension, were understood by the
Founders as inextricably intertwined.292 At the same time that the Founders
appreciated the relationship between property and liberty, however, they
worried that too much equality—too much democratic rule—would undermine property rights.293 According to Professor Jennifer Nedelsky, for example, the Founders themselves saw property both as central to their conception of democracy and as a reflection of natural inequalities.294 Since “an
unequal distribution of property was the inevitable result of men’s freedom
to use their ‘different and unequal faculties of acquiring property,’” the
property of the minority would always need to be protected from the majority that lacked it; individual property rights therefore had to be balanced
with democratic rule in the form of a constitutional democracy.295 Property
was understood as embodying a natural and inevitable hierarchy, and it is
this version of property that seems to motivate the Court’s decisions in
Summum and Buono.296
289

Cohen, supra note 23, at 12. Yet, Professor Cohen continues, “[t]he character of property as
sovereign power compelling service and obedience may be obscured for us in a commercial economy by
the fiction of the so-called labor contract as a free bargain and by the frequency with which service is
rendered indirectly through a money payment.” Id.
290 Joseph William Singer, Property Law as the Infrastructure of Democracy, in 11 POWELL ON
REAL PROPERTY WFL11-1, WFL11-9 (Michael Allan Wolf ed., 2011).
291 Joseph William Singer, Original Acquisition of Property: From Conquest & Possession to
Democracy & Equal Opportunity, 86 IND. L.J. 763, 776, 778 (2011) (“Property exists only if we have
property law, and law exists only if we have government to issue regulations. One cannot be for property and against government.”).
292 MCDONALD, supra note 257, at 36; John O. McGinnis, The Once and Future Property-Based
Vision of the First Amendment, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 49, 64-71 (1996).
293 MCDONALD, supra note 257, at 157.
294 Jennifer Nedelsky, American Constitutionalism and the Paradox of Private Property, in
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY 241, 244-45 (Jon Elster & Rune Slagstad eds., 1988).
295 Id. at 244 (quoting THE FEDERALIST, NO. 10, at 58 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961)).
296 Neil Hertz has discussed a similar concept of property in connection with the French Revolution—and particularly the views of those who were troubled by it. He identifies an appreciation of
property as “a natural sign of legitimate inequalities” in the likes of Edmund Burke and Alexis de
Tocqueville. Neil Hertz, Medusa’s Head: Male Hysteria Under Political Pressure, REPRESENTATIONS,
Fall 1983, at 27, 38. The Supreme Court, writing in the Lochner era, expressed a similar view:
No doubt, wherever the right of private property exists, there must and will be inequalities of
fortune[.] . . . And, since it is self evident that, unless all things are held in common, some
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Indeed, Professor Joan Williams has documented the continuing influence, exerted in part through the canonical cases of property law, of the
view that property derives from individuals’ own hard work and merit; as
such it “sets . . . off limits” any question about the unequal distribution of
property rights today, suggesting that such inequality is a natural effect of
property’s origins in “human hunger and human sweat.”297 Relatedly, Professor Cheryl Harris has elucidated, powerfully and at length, the relationship between property and racial inequality.298 For example, she describes
how the “racial and cultural otherness” of the Native Americans came to be
“reinterpreted and ultimately erased as a basis for asserting rights in land”;
today, when race-conscious remedies are proposed to make up for past inequalities, property rights are again asserted as a neutral reason for refusing
to upset existing entitlements.299
This naturalization of inequality risks reinforcing existing inequalities
by making them invisible. And by presenting apparently neutral principles
for judicial decision making, in the form of protecting preexisting ownership rights according to well-established legal regimes, property law arguably both reinforces the underlying economic inequalities and makes those
inequalities seem like a mere preexisting fact, a natural state of affairs in
which the law has played no role.300 Though it is not the only possible conception of property, the Supreme Court’s particular deployment of property
in Summum and Buono—as a means of eliminating rather than embracing
claims for inclusion and masking rather than leveling inequality—
highlights the association between property and inequality. Moreover, by
appearing to appeal to neutral principles of property law, the Court’s decisions in both Summum and Buono resulted in governmental acts of exclusion. In Summum, the exclusion of Summum’s message was literal. Once
the speech in Pioneer Park was characterized as belonging to the City, the
reasons for Summum’s exclusion seemed irrelevant; the City could obviously construct its message—that is, use its property—however it wished.
The inclusion of the Ten Commandments in that identity message, moreover, did not appear to strike the majority as problematic.
persons must have more property than others, it is from the nature of things impossible to
uphold freedom of contract and the right of private property without at the same time recognizing as legitimate those inequalities of fortune that are the necessary result of the exercise
of those rights.
Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 17 (1915).
297 Williams, supra note 257, at 287-89. Professor Joan Williams attributes this view of property
partly to John Locke, of course.
298 Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1714 (1993); cf. PATRICIA J.
WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 47 (1991) (describing “how the rhetoric of increased
privatization, in response to racial issues, functions as the rationalizing agent of public unaccountability
and, ultimately, irresponsibility”).
299 Harris, supra note 298, at 1721, 1777-78.
300 Cf. Nedelsky, supra note 294, at 261-62.
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In Buono, both the literal exclusion of all other speakers—including
the Buddhists who wished to erect a shrine at the site of the cross—and the
symbolic exclusion of nonadherents in the form of the cross’s message
were reinforced by the use of the property framework. 301 Of course, a private party could not be forced to allow a Buddhist shrine on its land, property law tells us. The literal exclusion thus seems a matter of common
sense. The symbolic exclusion of non-Christians from the war memorial—
and its invisibility—is perhaps best exemplified by Justice Scalia’s exchange with plaintiff’s counsel over the sectarian nature of the Mojave Desert cross to this dynamic of naturalized inequality or hierarchy.302 The exchange proceeded as follows:
JUSTICE SCALIA: [The cross is] erected as a war memorial. I assume it is erected in honor
of all of the war dead. It’s the -- the cross is the -- is the most common symbol of -- of -- of
the resting place of the dead, and it doesn’t seem to me -- what would you have them erect?
A cross -- some conglomerate of a cross, a Star of David, and you know, a Moslem half
moon and star?
MR. ELIASBERG: . . . . The cross is the most common symbol of the resting place of Christians. I have been in Jewish cemeteries. There is never a cross on a tombstone of a Jew. 303

Justice Scalia then characterized as “outrageous” the notion that “the
only war dead that that cross honors are the Christian war dead.”304 Justice
Scalia’s inability to see the sectarian nature of the cross as a symbol of the
dead may well be due to personal experience, upbringing, or biases. But it
also seems to reflect a viewpoint that resounds deeply with the rhetoric of
property-as-exclusion and its tendency to treat social structures as inevitable and hierarchies as natural. Justice Scalia’s remark suggests that the
cross’s meaning as a war memorial is owned by the majority and thus dictated by the majority viewpoint.305 Moreover, any claim for inclusion or
equal regard is almost illegible in this context, in which the cross is private
property, to be exchanged at will, rather than a symbol the meaning of
which must be evaluated according to First Amendment constraints.
This propertization of the memorial and its message casts nonadherents to Christianity, if not as unwelcome intruders, then as “guests” in another’s home or ceremony, to adopt Professor Alan Brownstein’s elegant
301

Buono v. Norton, 371 F.3d 543, 550 (9th Cir. 2004).
Oral Argument at 40:21, Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010) (No. 08-472), available at
http://oyez.com/cases/2000-2009/2009/2009_08_472 [hereinafter Oral Argument].
303 Id.
304 Id. at 41:24.
305 Though this Article uses the term “Christian majority,” the religious landscape in the United
States is extremely complicated, and in actuality, no single religious denomination constitutes a majority. However, Christians in general are still the majority in America. See generally ROBERT D. PUTNAM
& DAVID E. CAMPBELL, AMERICAN GRACE: HOW RELIGION DIVIDES AND UNITES US (2010).
302
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metaphor.306 To place non-Christian veterans and visitors to the national
memorial in that role, whether because of the Government’s ownership of
the symbol or a private party’s ownership, is to grant them the social status
of an outsider, or at least a non-insider. But as Professor Martha Nussbaum
argues, American democracy and respect for human dignity, expressed in
part through the Establishment Clause, “may not make citizenship hierarchical. . . . [A]ll citizens must be able to enter the public square on equal
conditions.”307 Indeed, evoking feudal imagery, Professor Nussbaum asserts
that “a failure of respect in the symbolic domain is like an insult, a slap in
the face, and, moreover, it is the sort of slap in the face that a noble gives to
a vassal, one that both expresses and constitutes a hierarchy of ranks.”308
The Court’s ultimate disposition of Buono—its privatizing of the cross
and concomitant assumption that the property transaction would answer the
Establishment Clause question—allowed the Court to decline to grapple
with the very real challenge presented to Justice Scalia’s viewpoint by
plaintiff’s counsel’s response.309 But perhaps more importantly, it erased the
very question that the Court was supposed to answer—whether the cross
impermissibly cast non-Christians as outsiders—by treating that outsider
status as a natural and inevitable function of the preexisting property entitlements, both legal and metaphorical.310
The formalizing and naturalizing rhetoric of private property encourages the reader to focus not on the underlying constitutional values but rather on legal entitlements to land and objects. This function of the Court’s
rhetoric is particularly troublesome in the context of First Amendment doctrine, however. The property framework embraced in Summum and Buono,
and the absolute control and right to exclude that it implies, conflict pro-

306

Professor Alan Brownstein discusses the “guest” analogy in the context of sectarian high school
graduation prayers. Alan E. Brownstein, Prayer and Religious Expression at High School Graduations:
Constitutional Etiquette in a Pluralistic Society, 5 NEXUS 61, 78 (2000). As he explains:
If I attend a religious ceremony, such as a wedding, at the invitation of a friend of another
faith, I am not going to feel offended at the prayers that are offered at this ceremony. I may
not be able to participate in some of these expressive activities, but that is hardly the basis for
offense. I am a guest, after all, a conceded outsider and visitor to the religious ceremony of
another faith. . . . Public school graduations are very different. My children are not guests at
their own graduation.
Id. Similarly, one might point out that non-Christian citizens and veterans are not guests in the National
Park or at National Memorials. The author is grateful to Professor Brownstein for drawing her attention
to this article. Cf. Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2989 n.18 (2010) (noting that a
religious student group’s “[w]elcoming all comers as guests or auditors . . . is hardly equivalent to
accepting all comers as full-fledged participants”).
307 NUSSBAUM, supra note 34, at 227.
308 Id. (emphasis added).
309 See Oral Argument, supra note 302, at 41:21.
310 See generally Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010).
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foundly with the core ideals of equality and inclusion that animate the endorsement test.
As Professors Christopher Eisgruber and Lawrence Sager have pointed
out, the endorsement test is concerned primarily with equality, with “equal
liberty” of conscience, and with avoiding the disparagement of religious
outsiders in society.311 The concept of equality is closely tied to the concept
of inclusiveness, particularly with respect to religious outsiders. Thus, other
First Amendment scholars have also highlighted the connection among the
endorsement test, inclusion, and equality. In an early meditation on the endorsement test, Professor Neal Feigenson argued that the test “prohibits
government from using religion to affect its citizens’ participation in the
political community” with the goal of ensuring equality.312
After all, the purpose served by ensuring such specific civil rights as the right to vote, speak
freely, hold office, or serve on juries is to guarantee to each citizen an equal opportunity to
wield lawfully the power of persuasion and thus to help shape political decisions. Equal participation is the ultimate value.313

Similarly, Professor Lisa Shaw Roy has noted that the Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence pertaining to religious displays “is largely about
protecting the feelings of the nonadherent from a public manifestation that
may confer outsider status.”314
Professor Nussbaum has also, recently and influentially, articulated a
theory of religious freedom and nonestablishment grounded in equality and
equal respect.315 In regard to public displays of religious symbolism, in particular, Professor Nussbaum contends that a decisional framework focused
on supporting equality and avoiding the stigmatization of minority religions
and nonreligious individuals is the best one.316 Indeed, she argues that the
equality-based understanding of the Establishment Clause fits best with the
original, historical understanding of the First Amendment and its underlying principles.317
For this reason, too, the defense of the Court’s recent religious symbolism jurisprudence on the ground that it is intended simply to defuse cultural tensions must be rejected.318 The Court’s approach, though perhaps
aimed at avoiding divisiveness, poses a significant risk of rendering invisi311

EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 22, at 122-27.
Neal R. Feigenson, Political Standing and Governmental Endorsement of Religion: An Alternative to Current Establishment Clause Doctrine, 40 DEPAUL L. REV. 53, 66-67 (1990).
313 Id. at 67 (footnote omitted).
314 Lisa Shaw Roy, The Establishment Clause and the Concept of Inclusion, 83 OR. L. REV. 1, 20
(2004).
315 NUSSBAUM, supra note 34, at 34-71.
316 See id. at 260-65.
317 See id. at 34-114.
318 See supra text accompanying note 193.
312
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ble the harm of exclusion—harm that will not be less real simply because it
goes unacknowledged. The precise tendency of property language is to render natural and invisible the act of exclusion; it is thus no answer to those
who claim to have received a symbolic message of exclusion to say that the
Court will resolve religious disputes on property grounds in order to submerge disagreement over the exclusionary nature of the display’s message
and whether it is constitutionally permissible. What appears to be consensus
may be more accurately characterized as a suppression of debate in favor of
the status quo.
3.

Property, Identity, and Expression

Scholars have noted the expressive nature of property.319 Justice Alito,
too, highlighted the ability of monuments to “speak for” a city.320 In addition, monuments not only speak for the government—they purport to represent something about the government’s identity. In this way, the concepts
of property, attribution, and identity are intimately related in the expressive
function of both the symbol itself and the government’s ownership and
placement of it. Indeed, the very term “property” derives from the Latin
word that also refers to that which is individual and specific to oneself; we
speak of persons and things as having certain “properties,” in the sense of
identity traits.321
Professor Carol Rose, in examining the concept of possession in relation to property, has written of possession as a form of communication.
Using the example of adverse possession, Professor Rose notes that it is not
so much actual control but a “declaration of one’s intent to appropriate” that
is key to indicating possession for the purposes of triggering that doctrine.322
“Possession as the basis of property ownership, then, seems to amount to
something like yelling loudly enough to all who may be interested,” she
concludes.323 “The first to say, ‘This is mine,’ in a way that the public understands, gets the prize, and the law will help him keep it against someone
else who says, ‘No, it is mine.’”324

319

E.g., Blocher, supra note 28; Dolan, Government Identity Speech, supra note 114.
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 470 (2009).
321 See, e.g., THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1405 (4th ed.
2006) (giving one definition of property as “[a] characteristic trait or peculiarity, especially one serving
to define or describe its possessor,” and noting the word’s derivation from the Latin word proprius);
C.T. LEWIS, ELEMENTARY LATIN DICTIONARY 664 (1963) (defining proprius as “not common with
others, own, special, several, individual . . . each man’s own, . . . [p]ersonal”).
322 Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 77 (1985) (citing 2
BLACKSTONE, supra note 257, at *9, *258).
323 Id. at 81.
324 Id.
320
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Similarly, the government’s possession of a religious symbol, and its
treatment of that symbol as its property, seems to say that the symbol “belongs to” our polity and is intimately connected with it. It is an act of defining a political community through its possession of the symbol.325 One
might think of the original act that gave rise to the Buono litigation as such
an act.326 Whether so intended or not, the private citizens’ act of installing a
sectarian war memorial on government-owned property appears as a form
of claim staking, forcefully and forcibly identifying the nation, and the national experience of loss in World War I, with the Christian symbol, and
vice versa.327 In the words of Professor Nussbaum, “[s]tates really do want
to announce that theirs is a Christian, or perhaps a Judeo-Christian, state,”
and they do so in part by erecting sectarian symbols in public spaces.328
The government’s ownership and control of the symbol as property is
itself a speech act that both describes and constructs a particular reality—a
reality in which the community at issue is designated a Christian community.329 This effect, moreover, is magnified by the ultimately circular and selfdefining nature of this exercise in possession. The more the government
announces its exclusion of those who do not “belong,” the more it is entitled to do so—that is, the less likely it is that the forum at issue will be
found to be a public forum subject to constraints on viewpoint discrimination.
The longer and the more notorious the exclusion, too, the more likely
that religious symbols challenged under the Establishment Clause will be
found to have acquired a sort of immunity by “adverse possession.”330 An
example of this kind of adverse possession arises in the case of the Ten
Commandments monument in Van Orden v. Perry, which, Justice Breyer
noted, had gone unchallenged for forty years and was therefore unlikely to
be divisive:

325

Relatedly, Professor Zick has expressed concern about the way in which Summum, and its use
of private property analogies, undermines free speech and public forum concepts by treating a public
park both as a locus for, and as a form of, expression of a government message, rather than as a space
for expression of the public’s messages in the form of a diversity of private voices. Timothy Zick,
Summum, the Vocality of Public Places, and the Public Forum, 2010 B.Y.U. L. REV. 2203.
326 Buono v. Norton, 371 F.3d 543, 548-49 (9th Cir. 2004).
327 Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1811-12 (2010) (plurality opinion).
328 NUSSBAUM, supra note 34, at 266. Along similar lines, Professor Adam Samaha has suggested
that one of the principal problems with public displays of religious symbolism is not so much that the
displays attempt to proselytize as that they perform a “sorting” function along religious lines—they
signal the religious composition of a community and encourage geographical separation along religious
lines. Samaha, supra note 172, at 137-38.
329 In an earlier article, the author discussed at length the power of religious speech acts both to
describe and to construct a particular reality. Hill, supra note 179, at 735, 756-58.
330 See JOHN WITTE, JR. & JOEL A. NICHOLS, RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
EXPERIMENT 235 (3d ed. 2011).
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As far as I can tell, 40 years passed in which the presence of this monument, legally speaking, went unchallenged . . . . Those 40 years suggest that the public visiting the capitol
grounds has considered the religious aspect of the tablets’ message as part of what is a
broader moral and historical message reflective of a cultural heritage.331

Through a kind of adverse possession, this language implies, the Ten
Commandments have become a part of our culture, losing their quality as a
religious symbol affiliated only with certain religious belief systems. Like
many instances of so-called “ceremonial deism,” including the words “under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance and the words “In God We Trust” on
our coins, Justice Breyer’s language and logic imply, such symbols are unchallengeable because our culture has come to possess them and become
identified with them in this manner.332
Finally, and relatedly, the shift to a property paradigm for deciding religious symbolism cases also shifts control over the meaning of the government’s actions from the hypothetical “reasonable observer” back to the
government. Although some have argued that the endorsement test’s “reasonable observer” embodies the viewpoint of the “reasonable nonadherent,”333 and others have criticized the test for failing to do so, the endorsement test clearly does not allow the government to definitively establish the
meaning of its own message.334 In disjunctively providing that a governmental act is forbidden if it has the purpose or effect of sending an alienating message to religious outsiders, the endorsement test instead explicitly
recognizes that the government may send a message that is other than what
it intended, but that the unintended message may still cause constitutional
injury.335 The property paradigm, by contrast, allows the government to
short-circuit the endorsement inquiry, rendering the perspective of the
viewer irrelevant. Although the endorsement test may have a tendency to-

331 Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 702-03 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring). Indeed, it is unclear
what the limitations period is for this form of adverse possession, but forty years seems to be a fair
guess. See id.; Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 684 (1984) (“In any event, apart from this litigation
there is no evidence of political friction or divisiveness over the crèche in the 40-year history of Pawtucket’s Christmas celebration.”).
332 See generally Hill, supra note 179. Similarly, Neil Hertz, describing Alexis de Tocqueville’s
memoirs (entitled Souvenirs), observes that Tocqueville begins by noting that it was written “à Tocqueville” (at Tocqueville). For Hertz, this coincidence of name and place is more than a pun or a random
felicity: it demonstrates how property both represents privilege and naturalizes it. As Hertz explains:
“Tocqueville himself no doubt hardly gave a thought, as he wrote that line, to the fact that his name was
his place. Whatever self-satisfaction inheres in that coalescence of an individual, a family and some
acreage would operate in ways that had, by time, been muted and quasi-naturalized.” Hertz, supra note
296, at 37-38.
333 See, e.g., Roy, supra note 314, at 17 & n.78.
334 See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 1988 Term—Leading Cases, 103 HARV. L. REV. 228, 234 & n.46
(1989); Developments in the Law—Religion and the State, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1606, 1648-49 (1987).
335 See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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ward indeterminacy or even a majoritarian bias, the property paradigm
eliminates consideration of the religious outsider altogether.336
IV. REFLECTIONS ON SUMMUM AND BUONO IN THE CONTEXT OF THE
CULTURE WARS
This Part provides some brief reflections on how one might understand
the shift to property law and rhetoric in the Supreme Court’s religious symbolism jurisprudence, placed in the broader context of the culture wars. The
property paradigm may be understood both as a way of harnessing the power of property in articulating the harm perceived by certain members of
society when the public square is stripped of religious symbolism and as a
way of re-inscribing a societal power structure that may have been threatened, in one domain, by the rise of the endorsement test.
First, the use of the private property framework may be understood as
an attempt to find a powerful way of articulating the nature of the injury
suffered by those who would keep their religious symbols in a privileged
place. As Professors Eisgruber and Sager have eloquently explained, passions are intense both for and against the removal of religious symbolism in
public places.337 Yet, it is difficult to explain precisely why individuals on
both sides are so invested in the controversy—and, particularly, why the
absence of religious symbolism is considered by some to be a form of disparagement equivalent to that experienced by religious outsiders confronted
with symbols of the majority religion.338 By placing an overlay of private
property rhetoric on the religious speech at issue, those who would preserve
the right of the government to place certain symbols of its choosing in the
public square call forth all of the emotional power that the concept of property—particularly in its traditional Blackstonian manifestation—evokes in
the American imagination.
Numerous commentators have noted the uniquely emotional attachment that many Americans have to the concept of property. Indeed, the idea
of property possesses a certain “mythic quality.”339 As Professor Nedelsky
explains the appeal of property to the Founders, “[p]roperty was ‘something’ which was important, which required and was entitled to protection,
which could be threatened and whose destruction or violation would cause
far-reaching damage.”340 The mere invocation of property, especially when
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Hill, supra note 49, at 493-95.
EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 22, at 128-30.
338 Id.
339 Nedelsky, supra note 294, at 244.
340 Id. at 252 n.19. Indeed, Professor Nedelsky adds, “It is as though property rights have remained
infused with a natural-rights quality long after natural-rights theories were no longer accepted.” Id.
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physical ownership of property is involved, is a “‘showstopper[] of persuasion.’”341
In other words, casting religious symbolism in terms of property rhetoric gives concrete shape to the injury that some members of society feel
when their religious symbols are removed. The loss of the symbols is a loss
of status, of one’s standing within the social hierarchy—just as a loss of
one’s property in feudal times would accompany a loss of social or political
status and of one’s particular relationship to the sovereign. Viewed as such,
removal of religious symbols from the public square is a kind of “taking” of
the Christian majority’s heretofore privileged status.
Indeed, Professor Gene Nichol has described in very similar terms his
experience when, as President of the College of William and Mary, he
made the decision to remove a historic crucifix from its place of prominence in the college chapel. “What surprised me,” he writes,
was how frequently and how powerfully so much of the discussion and correspondence I had
with opponents of my decision also tracked the rhetoric of equality disputes—echoing not
only the rejection of the different, of the stranger, but pressing claims of status, of entitlement, of expectation, of privilege and ownership.342

Tying his own experience to Professor Nussbaum’s theory that the value of
equality must guide decision making on the permissibility of religious symbolism, he argues that “efforts to insist on the governmental display of majority religious symbols” tend to “stake a visible claim of ownership, identifying an institution, or a locale, or a government, as their own.”343
Property rhetoric may be appealing for another reason, as well. In her
recent history of the role of religious groups in shaping the constitutional
law of religion, Professor Sarah Barringer Gordon notes that in both the
1950s and the Cold War, perceived threats to the dominant Christianity
from secularizing forces in American society were closely associated with
communism in the minds and rhetoric of the Christian Right.344 “In their
341

Fagundes, supra note 26, at 691 (quoting Margaret Jane Radin, Information Tangibility, in
ECONOMICS, LAW AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 395, 400 (Ove Grandstrand ed., 2003)); see also
Dagan, supra note 23, at 84 (discussing the power of property rhetoric).
342 Gene R. Nichol, Establishing Inequality, 107 MICH. L. REV. 913, 928-29 (2009) (reviewing
NUSSBAUM, supra note 34).
343 Id. at 930. In a recent article, Professor Risa Goluboff similarly reflects that the Supreme
Court’s opinion in Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972), which struck down a state
vagrancy law as void for vagueness, was on one level a case about “place,” and the role of law in “demarcat[ing] who was out of place in a given community—who was denied full respect for their mobility, their autonomy, their lifestyle, or their beliefs”; thus “vagrancy cases both reflected and propelled the
larger culture wars of the 1960s.” Risa L. Goluboff, Dispatch from the Supreme Court Archives: Vagrancy, Abortion, and What the Links Between Them Reveal About the History of Fundamental Rights,
62 STAN. L. REV. 1361, 1371-72 (2010).
344 SARAH BARRINGER GORDON, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAW: RELIGIOUS VOICES AND THE
CONSTITUTION IN MODERN AMERICA 145-46 (2010).
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view, secularism and communism traveled hand in glove, while religion
and American democracy provided the only reliable safeguards against the
Communist conspiracy.”345 In the later twentieth century, secularism also
became associated with the struggle for equal rights for women and racial
minorities.346 Today, these sentiments—anticommunism, antifeminism, and
anti-civil rights—continue to hold some sway, in some contexts. Yet, they
seem to lack the emotional power that they held fifty, or even twenty-five,
years ago. Though culture war disputes continue to rage around women’s
reproductive rights, the status of traditional marriage, and affirmative action, a return to the language of property conjures an emotional response
unlike most appeals to anticommunism and anti-equal-rights sentiments. It
draws on a rhetoric that is both new and venerable, distinct from the earlier
rhetoric of anticommunism and antifeminism, yet affiliated with them in its
individualism and in its valorization of the hierarchical status quo.347
The turn to property talk may also be a response to a perceived imbalance of power in this particular legal domain that had taken hold during the
time that Justice O’Connor’s endorsement test held sway. The tendency of
property to present the preexisting social order as natural and foreordained
must be appealing to those Justices who felt that the “outsider” perspective
of the nonadherent had come to dominate Establishment Clause jurisprudence in this area.348 The language of private property is a response to the
rise of the reasonable observer and a reassertion of the government’s power,
on behalf of the majority, to control the meaning of its symbols.
V.

A RETURN TO FIRST AMENDMENT PRINCIPLES

The Court should abandon its focus on property in religious display
cases, at least insofar as it serves as a device for simplifying difficult First
Amendment questions. Though the endorsement/equality approach is not
without its flaws, a further elaboration of the constitutional values underlying these disputes is preferable to avoidance.349 Moreover, to the extent that
345

Id. at 145.
Id. at 154-56.
347 Indeed, one need only observe the uproar surrounding the Supreme Court’s decision in Kelo v.
City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005), a takings case that was relatively uncontroversial and unsurprising in terms of constitutional doctrine but that evoked enormous public protest, to see the continuing
sway that property exercises in contemporary society and politics. See, e.g., Ilya Somin, The Limits of
Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2100, 2108-14 (2009).
348 Cf. Meyler, supra note 42, at 108 (noting that, to the extent the historicity of monuments becomes a reason for maintaining them, this rationale favors mainstream and longstanding religious traditions over newer ones).
349 See supra note 49 and accompanying text (noting commentators’ criticisms of the endorsement
test); supra note 243 and accompanying text (noting commentators’ criticisms of the public forum
doctrine).
346
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the Court has adopted property as a means to defuse cultural tensions
stemming from the Court’s articulation of the meaning and import of religious symbolism, a more refined approach to the endorsement/equality inquiry may be possible.
Though there is reason to fear that the Court’s property paradigm
might continue to exert influence in future cases, there is also reason to
believe that this is not an inevitable outcome. Both Summum and Buono
were characterized by certain idiosyncrasies that would allow the Court to
avoid their full impact in the future.350 In Buono, the complex history of
procedural maneuvering and congressionally authorized property transactions make the case somewhat sui generis.351 In addition, the Court neither
decided the Establishment Clause question nor officially abandoned the
endorsement test; consequently, it may well be able to return to the endorsement test in a future case raising the issue of a religious symbol on
technically private, but ostensibly public, land.352
Likewise, Summum was an odd sort of public forum challenge. It is
hard to imagine the Court reaching a holding that a public park must be
open to anyone who wants to place a permanent monument there.353 Given
the oddity of the facts and the particular nature of the plaintiffs’ claims in
Summum, then, the Court can limit its potential future damage by cabining
its holding to its context of permanent, privately donated monuments in a
public park, and resisting the temptation to allow the government speech
doctrine to expand beyond its original borders.354 Finally, the Supreme
Court in Summum decided no Establishment Clause issues, and it may well
have occasion in the near future to decide a similar issue.
Indeed, the Supreme Court recently considered a case involving the
constitutionality of privately owned Latin crosses on public property serving as memorials to fallen highway patrolmen, which the Tenth Circuit held
to be government speech and to violate the Establishment Clause.355 Alt350

See Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1812-14, 1819-21 (2010) (plurality opinion); Pleasant
Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 464 (2009); see also infra notes 351-354 and accompanying
text.
351 See Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1812-14 (plurality opinion).
352 See id. at 1819-21 (remanding to the district court for an inquiry into whether the reasonable
observer would find an endorsement of religion in the cross’s presence on private land). Although
Buono is unusual in its procedural posture, it is not entirely unusual for governmental entities to seek to
avoid Establishment Clause claims by manipulating the ownership of the symbol or the land on which it
sits. See generally Forster, supra note 132.
353 See, e.g., Zick, supra note 325, at 2204 (“Insofar as the result is concerned, the decision in
Summum is facially unassailable. Just imagine the chaos that would ensue if governments were required
to accept either all privately donated monuments or none at all.”).
354 See id. at 2223-28 (expressing concern that Summum will encourage expansion of the government speech doctrine); see also Norton, Imaginary Threats, supra note 168, at 1269-74 (documenting
expansive uses of the government speech doctrine in the lower courts).
355 Utah Highway Patrol Ass’n v. Am. Atheists, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 12 (2011) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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hough the Court ultimately denied certiorari, the existence of the case and
the significant controversy it engendered—including two dissents from
denial of rehearing en banc and one dissent from denial of certiorari—
indicate that the debate over religious symbolism in public spaces has hardly died down.356 For this reason, it is particularly worthwhile to consider
how the Court might approach such cases in the future.
As explained above, there is reason to be wary of the Court’s avoidance of underlying issues concerning the social meaning of religious symbolism and the proper role of public religious speech in a pluralistic society.
While appearing to resolve disputes in a neutral, legally defensible manner
without aggravating cultural dissension, the Court may simply be papering
over already-existing sentiments of exclusion and subordination. Using the
law and language of property in religious symbol cases does not actually, or
necessarily, turn a cultural and constitutional dispute into an ownership
quibble. Rather, it only aggravates the naturalization of hierarchy and exclusion that the endorsement/equality inquiry was intended to combat. For
this reason, a return to the underlying First Amendment principles is preferable to avoiding them.
Moreover, for the reasons described in Part III.B.1, the Court’s use of
property is overly simplistic. Property theorists and even the Court itself
have long recognized that the existence of a property right is often only the
beginning, not the end, of the inquiry, especially when public values are at
stake. Public property, after all, is held in public trust. Thus, a more inclusive and accurate understanding of property would require the Court, in
religious display cases, to consider property in a more nuanced way, and as
merely one set of factors in the overall endorsement/equality analysis, rather than as its final answer. Though ownership is relevant to questions of
attribution, social meaning, and access, it cannot define and limit them in
the formalistic way the Court has suggested. A more nuanced and thus
more desirable approach would recognize the complex relationship among
property, identity, attribution, and expression.
Finally, if the Court’s decisions are driven in large part by a desire to
turn down the temperature on religious symbolism disputes, it could focus
on refining the remedial side of the constitutional equation, rather than
changing its analysis of the merits. To the extent that the Court is concerned, for example, about the social message that may be sent when
longstanding monuments are dismantled in response to First Amendment
lawsuits—as various Justices have suggested they are—it might encourage
a more sensitive approach to remediation in such cases.357 Interestingly,
356

Id.; Am. Atheists, Inc. v. Davenport, 637 F.3d 1095 (10th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 12
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In Buono, for example, Justice Alito argued that removing the cross “would have been viewed
by many as a sign of disrespect for the brave soldiers whom the cross was meant to honor.” Salazar v.
Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1823 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring). He continued:
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both Justices Breyer and Alito have explicitly expressed such concerns, and
both have hinted at precisely such a remedy-based solution.358 In Buono,
Justice Alito suggested that the government might have “supplement[ed]
the monument on Sunrise Rock so that it appropriately recognized the religious diversity of the American soldiers who gave their lives in the First
World War.”359 Though perhaps still raising concerns about government
endorsement of religion over nonreligion, such a solution could in some
circumstances be appropriate—perhaps even more so if supplemented with
secular memorials as well. Similarly, Justice Breyer devoted his Buono
dissent to the notion that trial courts have broad discretion to shape and
enforce their injunctive decrees, such that they are entitled to deference
from appellate courts.360 Of course, detailed analysis of possible remedies,
their pros and cons, and their constitutionality is beyond the scope of this
Article; this Article simply argues that the possibility of more flexible remediation has not been fully explored in religious display cases, and it may
hold potential for preventing the aggravation of existing cultural disputes
while still recognizing and elaborating the underlying First Amendment
values.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court appears to have turned to property law and property rhetoric as a way of simplifying or avoiding difficult First Amendment
questions involving public displays of religious symbolism. 361 This turn to
property is troubling, however. The property paradigm valorizes and naturalizes the acts of exclusion and discrimination in the course of expressing a
message of religious identity. Both the endorsement test and public forum
principles, marginalized in Summum and Buono, require reform but not
interment; they are preferable to the current alternative.

The demolition of this venerable if unsophisticated, monument would also have been interpreted by some as an arresting symbol of a Government that is not neutral but hostile on matters of religion and is bent on eliminating from all public places and symbols any trace of our
country’s religious heritage.
Id. Similarly, Justice Breyer’s concurrence in Van Orden v. Perry expressed fear that holding the Ten
Commandments display unconstitutional “might well encourage disputes concerning the removal of
longstanding depictions of the Ten Commandments from public buildings across the Nation. And it
could thereby create the very kind of religiously based divisiveness that the Establishment Clause seeks
to avoid.” Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 704 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring).
358 Infra notes 359-360 and accompanying text.
359 Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1823 (Alito, J., concurring).
360 Id. at 1842-1845 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
361 Supra Part I.

